DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 247 871 HE 017 597

TITLE	The Functions and Problems of the Urban University: A Comparative Perspective.
INSTITUTION	City Univ. of New York, N.Y. Graduate School. Center for European Studies.
SPONS AGENCY	EXXON Education Foundation, New York, N.Y.
PUB DATE	Mar 82
NOTE	70p.; Papers presented by European scholars at the conference on functions and problems of the university (New York, NY, March 21-22, 1982).
PUB TYPE	Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Access to Education; *College Role; *Comparative Education; *Education Work Relationship; Foreign Countries; *Government School Relationship; Higher Education; Organizational Change; Public Policy; *Regional Planning; School Organization; Selective Colleges; *Urban Universities
IDENTIFIERS	France; Great Britain; Japan; Sweden; United States; West Germany

ABSTRACT

Issues concerning the urban university in Great Britain, France, Sweden, Japan, and West Germany are considered in the five selected conference papers that make up this document. In "Analysis in Politics: The Regionalization of Swedish Higher Education," Rune Premfors discusses how Swedish regionalization of higher education used partisan analysis. Ulrich Teichler's article, "Urban Higher Education: Experiences from Germany and Japan," compares policies in Japan and Germany and notes that neither nation excluded the idea of an urban university. A second article by Teichler, "Regionalization in West German Post-Secondary Institutions," discusses three goal-models of regionalization and conditions favoring the existence of urban universities. "Problems of the Urban University: Great Britain and U.S.A.," by Maurice Kogan, notes that Great Britain's system responds to the needs of industry and society by allowing college entrance only to students with high scores. He suggests that America's longer experience with urban universities might lead to providing solutions to the problem of wider access. In the final article, "Demography, Demogogy and Decline: or, How the Universities in France and Britain are Neither Grinning nor Bearing It," Guy Neave compares university systems in France and Great Britain, both of which aim to bring the university in line with the needs of the market place. (SW)

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PUBLICATION OF
THE CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

The Functions and Problems of The Urban University: A Comparative Perspective

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

HE 010 592

GRADUATE SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY CENTER
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Publication of
The Center for European Studies

The Functions and Problems of The Urban University: A Comparative Perspective

Published by The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

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Introduction

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As organizer of the conference on functions and problems of the urban university: a comparative perspective, I was impressed with the contributions in the papers of the European scholars and have decided to have a more lasting record of them. The papers of the American scholars, while equally important, can and have been related to other projects. The European essays were the results of efforts to see European higher education developments in new and unaccustomed ways, i.e., in terms of urban universities as defined in American terms and as exemplified in the largest of all such universities where the conference took place.

The countries discussed are developed industrial powers—Great Britain, France, Sweden, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.

For Premfors the theme with respect to Sweden related to the effects of policy analysis on regionalization in higher education. He focuses on three key decisions regarding regionalization policy. The first was establishing the U63 commission and the University of Norrland in Umea. A second, made three years later, was to create four university branches. The third saw the creation of the U68 commission which, given a broad mandate to inquire into all significant problems in post-secondary education, has as a major goal further regionalization of the university system. Policy analysis while attempting to base itself on technical, objective criteria was inevitably politicized. However, despite changes of government, regional units once established displayed vitality and remain strong. Premfors states that the experience in Sweden leads to the conclusion that only social interaction can justify regional planning, not analysis.

While Premfors showed how Swedish regionalization used partisan analysis, Teichler indicates how entrenched Germany academics overwhelmed regional planning. In comparing the Japanese and German situations, he notes that neither nation excluded the idea of an urban university. Most German universities are in remote towns. But this circumstance is changing since almost 30 per cent of present university enrollment is in five major German cities and four of the six largest universities are urban. Students now prefer urban universities because of employment and cultural opportunities.

The concentration of universities in major metropolises is very high in Japan — over a hundred in Tokyo alone. Private urban universities are important to absorb expanded enrollment since government policy has been to establish public universities as elite. The government subsidizes

private urban universities in order to maintain standards.

More particularly with respect to Germany, Teichler believes that the hopes aroused in the last decade for structural and curricular changes in higher education have not been fulfilled except for regional expansion. Regional planning that united older universities with newer institutions generally had difficulties but in regions without pre-existing universities, state planning successfully merged students from universities and from post-secondary vocational schools in common study.

Such regional universities fulfilled a government policy of attracting students from non-traditional backgrounds. At every level efforts were made to involve the community in creating new regional universities even in the awarding of construction contracts and especially in developing work study programs.

Teichler outlines three goal-models of regionalization: (a) different universities serving the same educational needs, (b) different universities serving specific regional needs and (c) different universities having special functions based on a national division of labor between the universities. Initially the German system adopted goal model (c) but with graduates becoming more immobile and in an era of shrinking resources, future planning will likely adopt regional goal model (b). Teichler holds with this trend in the sense that he contends regionalization has followed division of labor too much and regional service too little.

Defining an urban university as a university located in a large city which interacts with its community, he states four general conditions under which urban universities are likely to be found: where higher education does not rely on residential colleges, where the population is centralized, where the local elite influences the university's decision-making process and where the university is under pressure to expand beyond its traditional roles (offer community services, increase recruitment, etc.).

Kogan begins by asserting that urban functions which favor individual development over communication goals do not sit well with the classic definition of a university. Britain has kept true to the classical definition, responding to the needs of industry and society by opening up its collegiate ranks only to those with high scores. There has been no wholesale attempt at wider access. Indeed working class enrollment is declining and continuing adult education is faltering. The elite classical model is intact and will probably remain so even with the drastic reductions imposed by the Conservative government.

He hopes that adherents of the open access, urban university model would respect the values of the traditional model of higher education and concludes that since America has encountered problems of urban universities before Great Britain, it might lead with providing solutions.

Neave compares university systems in France and Great Britain. Both aim to bring the university in line with the needs of the market place. But each country seems to be seeking the model the other is abandoning, i.e.

under a Conservative administration the British are moving toward central government control while the Socialist French government proposes to decentralize in favor of "local liberty and regional self-control."

While both educational systems have been training their students primarily for state service and only incidentally for the private sector, the prolonged austerity in Europe is bringing pressure to "privatize" the job objectives of university students in both countries.

The socialist leaders in France speak increasingly of "economically relevant" disciplines and linkage to local industry in conjunction with their plans to decentralize. The Tory government in Britain has cut budgets sharply, resulting in sizeable layoff of faculty. It has shrunk the university opening to the community and apparently prefers a smaller but essentially the same hierarchical traditional university system. In conclusion Neave remarks that both countries may prove to be "intolerable" mirror images of each other.

For these five advanced industrial countries, urbanization of universities has highlighted for our four European scholars various aspects of regionalization, the process of decentralization, serious response to the community and increased access to the world of higher education. While conceding the greater scope and perhaps complexity of the urban university in America, they show in the analyses and interpretations of their educational system the kinds of insights that comparativists believe are of considerable value even to a massive system that is presently more intricately involved in the issues.*

*This introduction depends heavily on the summaries of papers provided in the first instance by Frederick Wasser, conference rapporteur, and secondarily by Gordon Blewis.

Analysis in Politics: The Regionalization of Swedish Higher Education

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Introduction

This paper is a research note from a study of the role of analysis in Swedish higher education policy. The larger study covers five major policy dimensions: quantitative planning, social recruitment, regionalization, governance and pedagogical methods. With respect to all these policy dimensions I ask to what extent and in what ways various forms of policy analysis and social research have affected policy formulation and implementation.

A starting point is the simple distinction between two major forms of social problem-solving: analysis and social interaction. Recent writings by Charles Lindblom (1977); also Lindblom and Cohen 1979) and Aaron Wildavsky (1979) have convincingly shown the fruitfulness of this distinction. Both argue that analysis (termed "intellectual cogitation" by Wildavsky) is generally accorded an exaggerated role in studies of social problem-solving in general, as well in that particular form, public policy-making. Social scientists tend to underestimate the importance of various forms of social interaction as problem-solving mechanisms, even in contexts where analysis seemingly provides the basic criteria for policy choices. Social interaction — which has two basic forms in problem-solving contexts: politics and markets — is more often than not the major determinant of outcomes. When analysis or intellectual cogitation appears in various guises it is normally as "partisan analysis" i.e., analysis tailored to fit policy positions already adopted (cf. also Lindblom 1980).

However, we are dealing with a complex relationship. The literature on knowledge utilization in social problem-solving has in recent years taken pains to illustrate the many ways in which policy analysis and social research may enter such processes (Premfors 1979a; Weiss 1980; Wittrock 1982). A lack of impact in the short run does not preclude considerable effects in the long run. The fact that analysis does not provide the "objective" criteria often sought by policy-makers and analysts, does not preclude that such activities slowly permeate the definition of problems and the formulation of choices.

This paper reports on the policy dimension of regionalization in Swedish higher education policy. Sweden has since the 1950s made a fairly

consistent effort to spread higher education across the country. In the sequel I will first provide an overview of this policy of regionalization and its major results. Three key decisions are identified during the period, and in three separate sections each is investigated in some detail with respect to both analysis and politics. In a concluding section the findings are summarized and their implications discussed.

An Overview of Policy Developments

Sweden is, at least in the European context, a large country with a small population. There are great variations in population density. Most people live in a small number of metropolitan areas, while the northern and most of the western parts of the country are thinly populated. The two ancient universities are located at Uppsala and Lund which are small towns but both situated in metropolitan regions. During the 19th century higher education institutions were also founded in the two major cities of Sweden, Stockholm and Gothenburg (Premfors & Ostergren 1978, pp. 3 ff.).

As late as the 1950s these four sites were the only ones with major institutions of higher education. In the course of that decade, however, smaller institutions of post-secondary education were created in other towns. In most cases they offered only short-cycle programs of vocational education, in particular in the areas of teacher training and nursing.

In Umea in the northern region of Norrland, developments in the 1950s resulted in a somewhat broader provision of higher education than in other sites outside the four major centers. Permanent resources were located in Umea for the training of dentists, medical doctors, teachers and, in the early 1960s, social workers. And in 1962 the decision was finally taken to create the University of Umea, Sweden's fifth full-fledged university.

The decision to create finally a "University of Norrland" at Umea was no doubt largely due to the exploding overall numbers in Swedish higher education. This also provided the impetus of the appointment in 1963 of an ad hoc commision to inquire into the future provision of higher education. The commission — known by the acronym U63 — reported in 1965. Its major proposal was the creation of four university branches. These would be "affiliates" of the four major universities and would be located in the medium-sized towns of Vaxjo (the University of Lund branch), Linkoping (Stockholm), Karlstad (Gothenburg) and Orebro (Uppsala). The university branches would only offer under-graduate teaching and would have no permanent facilities for research. The exception was Linkoping where there would also be full resources for education in technology and medicine. In 1970, three years after the founding of the university branch, Linkoping was transformed into a separate university college (*hogskola*), and in 1976 it became Sweden's sixth full-fledged university.

The late 1960s and the early 1970s also saw the creation of specialized institutions of higher education in other towns. Examples are a college of librarianship at Boras in western Sweden and a college of technology at Lulea in the northern part of the country.

In 1968 another ad hoc commission — known as U68 — was appointed

to investigate, among other things, the future localization of higher education institutions in Sweden. A major premise was a considerably broadened concept of "higher education." Higher education was now to include all post-secondary education and even forms of education which had hitherto been regarded as parts of the upper-secondary level of the Swedish educational system (Premfors & Ostergren 1978, pp 27 ff.). This broad concept implied that higher education was in fact offered not only in the university towns and in those having university branches, but in a quite large number of sites. In terms of the future localization of higher education the U68 Commission proposed that 14 towns or pairs of towns be designated as "growth centers." With its broad concept of higher education, all of these — with one possible exception — did in fact already have some form of permanent arrangement for higher education. In the future, however, they would be favored and receive in principle all additional resources for higher education expansion. The established institutions would not be allowed to grow further in the area of undergraduate education. For the planning of the regionalized provision of higher education, U68 proposed a fairly loose network of regional cooperation. However, a working party composed of parliamentarians which was appointed in 1974 in order to assist in the preparation of a Cabinet Bill for higher education reform, proposed a much more elaborate framework for regional planning. Sweden would be divided into six higher education regions, each surrounding one of the six full-fledged universities, and each having a regional board to govern it. The regional boards would be composed of representatives of a large number of interests, but would have a majority of members representing the "public interest" i.e., political parties and major interest organizations.

The proposals of U68 and the working part concerning the regionalization of higher education were accepted in all essentials by the Cabinet and the *Riksdag*. During the parliamentary deliberations in May 1975, however, two more sites were designated as future "growth centers." The rate of their growth was also to be somewhat lower than that envisioned by the U68 commission two years earlier.

The map on the next page shows the sites where permanent resources for higher education are located in Sweden in the early 1980s. To be up to date, the map ought to have included another site, the town of Halmstad on the west coast of the country. It was among the "growth centers" designated in 1975, but only very recently has a final decision been taken to create a full-fledged institution of higher education (*hogskola*) there.

All in all, Sweden now has 26 towns with permanent resources for higher education. Six of these are, however, joint operations in two sites (see map where these are indicated). But this is not the whole story. First, there are eight more towns which have small institutions representing "municipal higher education." These are owned and operated by local or county authorities. Most of them train nursery school teachers or nurses. Second, Sweden actually has a seventh university, the University of

Agricultural Sciences. Its major resources are located near Uppsala, but branches are found elsewhere as well. Thirdly, a number of mostly smaller towns have resources, now permanented following a period of "experimentation," for "vocational-technical higher education." These programs are training middle-level technicians in various branches of industry. They are often located near major industries, and the programs have been developed jointly with those industrial firms.

Finally, as in many other countries, Sweden has developed a quite extensive program of "distance teaching" and "decentralized university education." Building upon a fairly long tradition of various forms of teaching from the late 1960s, these activities are now quite impressive. From 1977 they are the responsibility of both the regional boards of higher education and individual institutions. In virtually all towns in Sweden, students can now take at least some courses of higher education without attending one of the permanent institutions.

Key Decision I: "The University of Norrland"

The analytic needs in a policy for regionalization in higher education seem to be of two major kinds. First, analysis is needed with respect to the general decision to regionalize and, if so, how much. Second, analytical underpinnings are needed for the decision about where to locate higher education.

The decision to create a "University of Norrland" at Umea involved little systematic analysis in both these respects. In his thorough study of this decision, Terry Carlbom points, however, to an early instance of analysis which at a long distance entered policy deliberations (Carlbom 1970, p. 25). In a pioneering research effort during the period 1929—1931, the health conditions in Norrland were investigated. The study illustrated the staggering disparities which existed between that region and other parts of Sweden. An important reason for this was obviously the lack of medical doctors and dentists. The study provided the impetus for a persistent effort on the part of regional and local interests to have educational resources for those professions located to Umea. As we have seen the lobbying was successful and Umea was able to build facilities in the areas of odontology and medicine during the 1950s. Similar arguments seemed to apply in teaching and social work, and higher education in those areas could start in the late 1950s and early 1960s respectively.

Forecasts of the future private demand for higher education and of the future labor market needs in certain professional areas were made in the late 1950s by an ad hoc commission, known as U55. In its major report on quantitative developments, published in 1959 (SOU 1959:45), U55 predicted an unprecedented expansion of student numbers in most areas. But it recommended that this expansion should occur in existing institutions and not through the creation of a fifth university. Its main argument in opposing the idea of a fifth university was that such an institution would not become a full-fledged research institution, since the Commission saw

Map: Sites with Permanent Resources for Higher Education

little need for further expansion of teaching and research in the humanities and some of the social sciences. This argument was, in its turn, based on its prediction of a substantial surplus of graduates in those areas.

Both Cabinet and *Riksdag* shared the opinion of U55 forecasts of private demand which proved to be widely off the mark. And in 1962, as we have seen, the decision was taken to establish a fifth full-fledged university at Umea. The University of Umea could start in the Fall of 1963.

Political pressures had been building for a "University of Norrland" at least since the 1940s. When the explosion in student numbers made such a university feasible, Umea had in fact no serious competitor as the site for Sweden's fifth university.

Carlbom has shown in detail how the forces in favor of Umea had converged throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. As we have seen, successive decisions added up to a quite substantial provision of higher education in certain areas. Furthermore, an important decision was taken in 1951 when the town library of Umea began to receive the fifth copy of all printed materials in Sweden. What about politics in the narrow sense? As early as 1948 Umea had set up a "Higher Education Committee" in order to lobby for a university. More important, according to Carlbom, was the persistent lobbying on the part of county interests — the county being the governmental level in Sweden which is responsible for health care. Altogether, however, Carlbom finds that these lobbying efforts were not decisive; the activity "was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to make Umea a university town" (Carlbom 1970, p. 47). Among the feasible sites, Umea had the advantage of being the most northern one. Together with the fact that it already had considerable resources for higher education, this "geographical factor" decided in favor of Umea (Carlbom 1970, p. 240).

Key Decision II: U63 and the University Branches

When the *Riksdag* in 1965 decided to create four institutions of a new kind, university branches, the decision had been prepared through a set of very ambitious analyses by the U63 Commission. The Commission had been composed of experts on higher education, chaired by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Sven Moberg. The other members were either university professors or representatives of industry or government agencies. A majority were or had been researchers. The head secretary was an expert on educational statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics.

The terms of reference of U63 stated clearly that the main issue was costs. Starting from forecasts produced by a special working party within the Ministry of Education (the so-called P-group, also headed by Moberg), the Commission should advise on the least expensive way of satisfying future demand. The Minister made no secret of his preferences for a sixth university, but the Commission was asked to perform cost analyses of other alternatives as well.

Initially the U63 seemed also intent on proposing the creation of a sixth

university, this time in central Sweden. But it started by formulating three different alternatives for future expansion. In brief they can be outlined as follows:

I expansion of the existing universities plus new facilities for technological and medical education;

II as I plus permanent resources for social sciences and humanities in a number of new sites;

III a sixth university in a new site.

Interestingly it would turn out that the three alternatives were almost equally expensive. The total costs would, according to the Commission's calculations vary less than two per cent between the least and the most expensive alternative. However, the Commission concluded that despite these marginal differences, Alternative II was clearly least expensive and thus to be recommended.

U63 admitted that its analysis of costs contained some arbitrary elements. It had wanted to perform an analysis of marginal costs per student, but this had proved to be impossible. Had such an approach been feasible, the report stated, "the differences between the alternatives would have pointed in other directions." And "the methodological difficulties may also have had the consequence that the absolute costs for all the alternatives must be judged as very approximate." Finally, the alternatives could have been formulated very differently:

> Such different formulations would then of course have resulted in other costs than those which the Commission has calculated. The Commission is fully aware that the formulation of alternatives and the methods of costing them in a decisive way determine the differences in costs which we have shown . . . The Commission does, however, attribute some importance to the differences in costs for the choice of alternative even if other reasons, primarily related to teaching and research, have been decisive for our choice (SOU 1965:11, pp. 232 f).

All in all, the Commission itself must be viewed as having produced a set of devastating disclaimers with respect to its costing effort.

A very interesting feature of the Commission's work was its consistent effort to let analysis decide by trying to provide "objective" criteria for its recommendations. General ideological arguments were not allowed to enter its argument in favor of regionalization. Apart from trying to show, as we have seen, that the university branch strategy was least expensive, it placed emphasis on the technical problems of expanding facilities in the existing university sites. In particular it pointed to the problem of student housing (SOU 1965:11, p. 233). Furthermore, a sixth university would take some considerable time to set up; it could not be a full operation until 1970 at the earliest (SOU 1965:11, p. 258).

U63 did in fact commission research on the role of higher education in regional economic development. An economist produced a report on the

various ways in which an institution of higher education could benefit the surrounding economy (Holm 1965). The analysis was very optimistic, but characteristically it was never used by the Commission in its argument in favor of regionalization. No study was undertaken or commissioned with respect to the impact of regionalization on patterns of student participation, and nowhere in the U63 report are such considerations cited in support of its recommendations.

Nor did such general arguments about regional effects enter the Commission's analysis of preferable sites for the four university branches. (A branch of the University of Umea was ruled out since it would, the Commission believed, threaten the growth of that recent institution.) The criteria it formulated were, or so it seemed, purely "mechanistic." First, there was the "recruitment basis" — a sufficient number of graduates from post-secondary schools within a reasonable distance from the university branch. These calculations produced a set of eight candidates. Second, the new university branches should not be too close to the existing universities. This singled out the four towns of Jonkoping, Karlstad, Orebro and Linkoping. Actually a third type of criteria had entered when Linkoping was selected in favor of the bigger town of Norrkoping; the former already had considerable resources for higher education and was traditionally a "town of learning."

The originally proposed branch of the University of Lund, Jonkoping, was, however, replaced by the smaller town of Vaxjo. Vaxjo had been discarded initially due to its proximity to Lund and its limited "recruitment basis." Now Vaxjo was selected since Jonkoping was too close to another university branch, that of Linkoping! As Carlbom points out, the choice between Jonkoping and Vaxjo highlights the Commission's difficulties of applying "mechanistic" criteria. At least four sets of criteria were involved — recruitment, distance to existing facilities, existing resources and distance to other proposed sites — and there was no way in which to decide the individual weight of each criterion. In the predicament created by such multiple criteria, a subjective element will inevitably enter:

> The subjective element lies in the freedom to choose between criteria which by their very nature are difficult to compare. This freedom to select the criteria of choice must be noted since they will determine the outcome with respect to localization. It should also be observed that this subjective element implies that one cannot decide what came first: arguments or conclusions (Carlbom 1970, p. 242).

The U63 proposal to create four new university branches was almost universally resisted in Swedish academia. The arguments against were traditional: The university branches would be of inferior quality since they would lack facilities for post-graduate education and research. University-level education required close links, including physical proximity, between teaching and research. The university branches represented a break with that principle, and were an attempt to get university education on the

cheap. An expansion of the existing universities or, perhaps a sixth university, was both possible and preferable.

This line of argument had a long tradition in academia as well as in Swedish higher education policy. Why did U63, a commission seemingly dominated by members with a research background, abandon it? Interestingly, a research-oriented argument had within the Commission been used **in favor of** the university branch strategy. Some Commission members were convinced that Sweden needed, if anything, a concentration and specialization in university-based research. A sixth university — as we have seen, the preferred strategy to begin with — would mean the opposite. Granted that Alternative I, i.e., an expansion of existing institutions was not feasible, university branches offering only undergraduate teaching was the logical answer (Carlbom 1970, pp. 74f.).

The U63 proposals were — very expectedly considering the role of the Under-Secretary in their formulation — immediately adopted by Cabinet. In the *Riksdag* a substantial majority voted in favor of the subsequent Cabinet Bill. The ruling Social Democratic Party accepted it without defections. Only the Conservative Party and some Liberals opposed it. With respect to the localization proposals there were many instances of parochial voting, but at no time did this threaten any of the designated sites. During the parliamentary debate many speakers marshaled the general arguments for regionalization which the U63 report had so consistently avoided.

Why did U63 avoid such arguments? Why did it try so hard to place its proposals in a technical framework, as practical solutions following logically from practical problems? Carlbom's view is that tactics played an important part. The chief ambition of the Social Democratic leadership in higher education policy was to have its proposals adopted without political debate. Consequently ideological rhetoric was to be minimized. The observation is, I believe, perfectly valid, but it should be added — particularly in view of later development — that many policy-makers of those days were genuinely convinced that the issues involved were to a large extent technical issues. Systematic and thorough analysis would largely eliminate the need for political conflict. The underlying values needed not to be made explicit since they were shared by all major interests. Private demand should be satisfied in higher education. "More of the same" should be provided. The details of how to accomplish this involved important choices but analysis would provide the criteria for these choices. Analysis singled out a strategy of regionalization. If regionalization of higher education would produce benefits in terms of social and economic impacts, this was of course lending support to such a strategy of expansion, but it was far from decisive for the choice to create the four university branches, nor did it determine their specific location.

Key Decision III: U68 and Regional Policy

U63 and U68 were very different commissions. While the former was narrowly focused on the task of proposing a strategy for quantitative

expansion, U68 was to inquire into all major problems in the future provision of post-secondary education (post-graduate education and research were explicitly left out). The regional distribution of higher education was an important task for U68, but other problems were equally important. Although the core of U68 consisted of top-level bureaucrats, this core was surrounded by three reference groups representing a plethora of interest groups, including the political parties and the major interest organizations. U68 was chaired by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Lennart Sandgren. Sven Moberg had recently been appointed to a new Cabinet post, that of Minister of Higher Education (Lindensjo 1981, ch. 3).

In contrast with those of U63, the terms of reference of U68 explicitly placed the problem of regionalizing higher education in a general regional policy context. The aim was "continued decentralization" of higher education provision. The Commission was asked to base its proposals on:

> . . . analysis of both the arguments for further decentralization and its specific localization, and of the broader economic consequences. . . Furthermore, the Commission should decide if and to what extent decentralized post-secondary education should be linked with the structure of regional economies and their need for manpower (SOU 1973:2, p. 289).

The Commission soon embarked upon an ambitious research program. A separate working group was set up to study regionalization. A study was commissioned on problems associated with student recruitment in a regional perspective. The research was performed at the Department of Geography at the University of Umea which had made studies on education in a regional framework a specialty. Research of great relevance to U68 was at the time being planned. With some modifications of purpose, this research could now be financed by U68. It was agreed that the study would focus on the following problems:

- the regional recruitment of students in 1960s;
- the development of regional enrollment ratios;
- the impact of the new university branches on regional patterns of recruitment;
- the "distance sensitivity" of various groups of students.

The research findings, reported successively to the working group and in a final published report (Holm & Haggstrom 1972), include a number of interesting observations with respect to all these problems. It was found, for example, that the university branches had mainly recruited their students from a rather narrow area surrounding their sites. This primary recruitment zone reached about 40 miles from the center. It was also calculated that about one-fifth of students enrolled in the university branches were "new recruits" i.e., they would not have enrolled in a higher education institution had it not been for the fact that they now had one nearby. Many students still chose, however, to bypass the university branches in favor of one of the full-fledged universities. About half among

them could have taken the same courses or programs in the university branch close to home.

In social class terms the creation of the branches had had some positive impacts, but the effects were rather small. Working class students were shown to be slightly more sensitive to long distances, but other groups were even more so. This was true of older students, female students and, in particular, of married women and students who had been admitted without the regular certificate from upper-secondary school. (An English summary of the research results is available in Hammarberg **et al** 1979.)

Another study commissioned by U68 concerned the issue of regionalization. The research was done by a team consisting of sociologists and economists. The study (Grahm, Sjostrand & Wingard 1971) illustrated that the highly educated were more mobile in geographical terms than other groups, but, more importantly for the Commission, also that they were disproportionately found in the metropolitan areas. The major reason for this was evident: they tended to remain at or near their place of study. The research report also predicted a considerable increase in the labor market demand for such manpower due to the structural transformation of the Swedish economy.

As already mentioned, the analysis of U68, in contrast with that of U63, explicitly started from the general goals of Swedish regional policy as it had evolved during the 1960s and early 1970s. Citing a number of key documents, U68 interpreted that policy as chiefly aiming at social equality, regional economic development, and regional balance with respect to both public and private services. In more specific terms, the policy included efforts to curb the growth of the metropolitan areas, and to create a number of "growth centers" which would constitute attractive alternatives to the big cities. An important policy instrument was redistribution of public services in favor of deprived areas. In the early 1970s a decision had, for example, been taken to relocate a number of government agencies (SOU 1973:2, pp. 326 ff.).

Higher education was a publicly financed activity and should consequently be among the means to the ends of regional policy:

> The localization of education affects regional development and should therefore be closely linked with the regional planning of employment and service. It is, in other words, essential to view the geographical distribution of education in the context of overall regional policy (SOU 1973:2, p. 321).

According to the Commission, a regionalization of the provision of higher education would effectively contribute to (SOU 1973: 2; see also Fasth 1980, pp. 47 f.):

- equality of participation by various groups;
- regional economic development;
- a better "study environment" for students;
- closer links between higher education and the local community.

In its analysis of the equality issue, U68 extensively and favorably quoted the study it had commissioned on regional patterns of recruitment. In general, it argued, "a decreasing average distance for students to study site will probably contribute to an equalization of participation on the part of different social groups" (SOU 1973:2, p. 309). In particular this would be true of those groups that the study had found were especially sensitive to long distances. It is interesting to note that the Commission had seemed somewhat more pessimistic with respect to the impact on social class in the comments it made when the research report was published (a year before the Commission main report). There U68 stated that an "undisputed correlation between social class and sensitivity to long distances could not be found" in the research report (SOU 1972:23, p. 8). Such cautionary remarks were absent from the main report.

With respect to regional economic development, U68 marshaled a whole series of research reports in support of its optimistic views on possible impacts. In general, analysis and debate on this issue had been lively in Sweden in the 1960s and early 1970s, so there was plenty to quote from. Especially appropriate for the Commission's argument was a study which had asked 35 experts about the impact of various activities on regional economies. In the study higher education came out at the very top. U68 also quoted a study of the impact of the University of Umea in which it was found that the positive effects were many and varied on the area's economy, especially on the employment situation. In addition, the Commission made use of the economic analysis which U63 had commissioned — and which the latter commission largely had ignored.

In the U68 analysis of the impact of higher education on regional economic development, the tendency for students to seek and find employment in or near their place of study was accorded great importance. Evidence was cited from the study it had itself commissioned, and which was mentioned above, but also from the follow-up studies which were now regularly undertaken by the National Bureau of Statistics. These studies showed that the newly graduated tended to find employment within the same county where they had passed their degree (SOU 1973:2, pp. 323 ff.). This was, in the Commission's view, a crucial argument in favor of regionalization.

As we saw from the list above, the U68 Commission also argued that regionalization would promote better "study environments" and closer links between higher education and the local community. As regards the former, students would gain from being able to stay in touch with their homes and other parts of their local network of social relations. With respect to the second aspect, the Commission argued that the new, relatively small institutions it proposed would become more open to local influences. They would imply an explicit rejection of campus-type solutions (SOU 1973:2, p. 315).

We may note in this connection that U68 also argued that a number of practical considerations spoke in favor of regionalization. The availability of

resources for new construction was among them. In contrast with U63, however, U68 could not marshal the argument of student housing. The fact was that in the early 1970s — and this casts an interesting light on the U63 analysis . . . — the problem was the opposite: the student housing areas of the university towns were to a large extent deserted (SOU 1973:3, p. 318).

How did U68 proceed in its analysis of the second major problem of regionalization efforts in higher education, the choice of specific sites? The Commission was aware of some of the tradeoffs involved. The new institutions ought not to be too small since applicants should have some variety to choose from in terms of courses and programs (SOU 1973:2, p. 336). And, equally important, too small institutions would not result in positive impacts on the surrounding economy. Furthermore, many types of higher education could profit from physical proximity to other types; the possibilities for innovation which would emanate from the integration of hitherto separate programs were in fact a major premise of the U68 philosophy as a whole (Premfors 1981). Finally, there were economies of scale involved as well.

The Commission established the following basic hierarchy of choice criteria:

I regional policy criteria would determine the "pool" of sites to choose from;

II educational considerations would determine the specific choices within this pool;

III if two sites were still equal then regional policy criteria would again be applied.

The first step within this analytic framework was simple from the Commission's point of view. In a Cabinet Bill (1972:11) adopted by the *Riksdag* in 1972 as part of general regional policy, a number of "primary growth centers" had been designated. These were from then on to be viewed as "big city alternatives," and would consequently receive disproportionate shares of public resources. In the U68 scheme these constituted the pool from which to select the sites where higher education institutions should be located.

The second step would, then, imply the application of educational criteria. What were they? First of all, the choices had to start from planned or expected levels of overall enrollment rates in higher education in order to establish how many sites there would be. In contrast with U63, the U68 had the advantage of not just having to rely on the vagaries of private demand since among its proposals was an important policy departure: it prosposed a system-wide **numerus clausus**. Private demand would in the future play a much less decisive role for the development of numbers in Swedish higher education (cf. e.g. Premfors 1979a and 1980, ch. 4). Such quantitative considerations justified, in the Commission's view, the designation of 14 sites (towns or pairs of towns) where the future growth of Swedish higher education should be concentrated. These had satisfied the regional policy criteria — by being "primary growth centers" — but

also, more or less, the following three educational policy criteria:

II.1 a sufficient number of potential applicants;

II.2 they were located at a sufficient distance from existing institutions;

II.3 they already had some provision of higher education.

The first criterion — potential applicants — was less straightforward than it had been for U63 since U68 had made adult and recurrent education part of its basic philosophy. The overall population was consequently as important as the number of graduates from upper-secondary education.

All in all, the criteria were complex and the room for subjective interpretations considerable. It seems that step III was actually never taken in the manner prescribed by the neat model of choice. Halmstad, for example, competed with the nearby town of Helsingborg. Halmstad was selected on the basis of regional policy criteria, but it was evidently weaker than Helsingborg according to the educational criteria. In particular, it had virtually no resources for post-secondary education. For another example, Ostersund in the northern region of Norrland was chosen over other "primary growth centers" of that region on the basis of regional policy criteria despite the fact that it was much weaker in terms of recruitment basis.

The subjective element can be further illustrated by examining the two sites that were to reappear in the Riksdag deliberations, Skovde and Gavle/Sandviken. In the Commission's analysis they were both discarded with reference to their possible detrimental effects on the universities at Gothenburn and Uppsala respectively. At least in the case of Gavle/Sandviken the choice situation was more complex than that since it depended on other choices by the Commission. Gavle/Sandviken would negatively affect Uppsala, **provided** that those other sites were designated within Uppsala's recruitment area.

In sum, the simplest way to describe the Commission's selection of sites is to say that it started from the pool of "primary growth centers," then relied on whether a town had some provision of post-secondary education or not — but this was not decisive in all cases — and in the final choice applied a plethora of more or less subjective considerations. Among the latter were undoubtedly instances of personal politics.

How were the U68 proposals for further regionalization received? Quite expectedly, the establishment of universities and other major institutions was bitterly opposed. They largely ignored the regional policy arguments, both the potential impacts on regional economic development and the allegedly positive effects on social equality. The disadvantages of spreading scarce resources were considered much more important. The new sites would get second-rate institutions since they would not receive permanent resources for research. In contrast with the situation eight years earlier, the university interests emphasized the alternative strategy of greatly expanding other forms of distributing higher education. Many proposed the creation of Swedish Open University. By contrast, the two

powerful national trade unions, TCO (white collar) and LO (blue collar), were staunch supporters of the Commission's proposals for regionalization.

As in 1965 the Conservative Party was essentially opposed to regionalization in higher education, as were many Liberals. The Social Democrats, the Center Party and the Communist Party were clearly in favor. Especially for the Center Party, with its traditional emphasis on regional development and justice, the proposals constituted a key aspect of higher education reform. A number of Center Party politicians would have preferred even more radical measures toward regionalization. As already mentioned, a working party composed of MPs was appointed in 1974 to assist in the preparation of a Cabinet Bill on the basis of the U68 proposals and some other commission reports. The purpose of the Social Democratic government in setting up this working party was to provide a forum where compromises could be hammered out, especially between themselves and the Center Party. The report of the working party was in all essentials supportive of the U68 proposals. As mentioned above, however, it also contained an important modification in the area of regionalization. A separate structure in the form of regional boards would be responsible for the planning of the future provision of higher education in six regions. In this respect, as well, the Conservatives and the Liberals were united in opposition. They argued that the major effect of a new regional planning structure would only be a further bureaucratization of Swedish higher education. Another level of decision-making would be added to the too many already existing.

However, with the support of three parties in the *Riksdag*, the proposals for regionalization could expect to be adopted by a comfortable majority. Virtually all that happened during the parliamentary deliberations in May of 1975 was that, as we have seen, two more "growth centers" were added to the list originally proposed by the U68 Commission. The two additional sites, Gavle/Sandviken and Skovde, entered the parliamentary agenda through private member bills signed by MPs from all five parties in the *Riksdag*. Expectedly, the initiative was an instance of parochial politics.

But the issue was not settled through the *Riksdag* decision of 1975. Another crucial decision was scheduled for 1977. Meanwhile the Social Democrats were ousted from power in the Fall of 1976. The non-socialist parties gained a majority in the general elections and formed a coalition government. The interesting situation now prevailed that within the new Cabinet the opponents of regionalization were in majority. Would the Center Party abandon its position in this policy area? Elsewhere I have analyzed the politics of this process in detail (Premfors 1979b). In brief, considerable log-rolling occurred but the Center Party stood firm throughout with respect to regionalization. In order to accomplish this it had to abandon other positions in higher education policy. Most importantly, it was forced to allow a "free sector" in higher education and thus much less control over the allocation of resources. This would turn

out to be a genuine threat to regionalization, and at the first opportunity it had — when the coalition government fell in the Fall of 1978 — it reestablished its policy coalition with the Social Democrats. Together they were able to establish finally the system-wide **numerus clausus** which the U68 Commission had originally proposed.

The issue of regionalization has continued to be controversial in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Conservatives and the Liberals are still opposed to the regional boards and are lukewarm at best to the new institutions of higher education. The present period of austerity, although higher education has been treated favorably with respect to government cutbacks, has sharpened conflicts between those who support the small institutions and those who want to allocate scarce resources disproportionately to the universities and other major institutions. Some have even proposed that some small institutions should be closed down.

Meanwhile many smaller institutions display impressive signs of vitality. While some have problems in terms of student recruitment and finances, they all pursue ambitious institutional policies with respect to cooperation with their surrounding community. Most are intent on expansion in the area of research, a sign of "academic drift" if you like, despite the fact that they will in all probability not get permanent resources for it in the foreseeable future. Altogether, they are now a permanent feature of the Swedish higher education landscape. Their political support seems firm. The Social Democrats, the Center Party and the Communists will not abandon them. Furthermore, their support from regional and local interests is considerable and growing. These interests will defend their institutions at all costs. Barring financial disaster in Swedish higher education there is no way back.

Concluding Discussion

The policy processes resulting in a marked regionalization of Swedish higher education have indeed involved a fair share of analysis. In an international perspective this feature of the processes is probably quite impressive. But even against the backcloth of Swedish traditions of public policy-making the regionalization of higher education seems to have been disproportionately supported by systematic analysis. The policy area invites analysis to a greater extent than many others.

The scope and character of analyses have varied greatly. Some have been simple exercises in statistical data collection or the costing of alternative courses of action. Others have been ambitious examples of applied social research, mainly in geography, sociology and economics.

As we have seen, policy-makers need analysis chiefly for two kinds of policy choices: first, in order to decide whether regionalization is a feasible strategy of higher education expansion, and, second, in order to select future sites of higher education institutions. But as should be evident from the above accounts of three key decisions, these policy choices are basically political. The Swedish policy of regionalization in higher education has clashed head on with established interests in academia. They would have

preferred a very different distribution of resources. Many were, and still are, true believers in traditional elite forms of higher education epitomized by the large research university. The policy of regionalization has also collided with the views of those who attribute little importance to the general goals of social equality and regional balance.

As for the policy choices determining the localization of institutions, we have seen that both U63 and U68 took great pains to establish "objective" criteria. Their efforts in this respect were admirable, but only partly successful. They could not conceal the subjective or even arbitrary elements involved. As soon as you design a model of choice containing multiple and basically non-comparable criteria, these elements are there for everyone to see, and instead of mechanistic applications of criteria your choice is based on not very precise tradeoffs. And, of course, the analyses of U63 and U68 revealed the considerable lack of precision with respect to individual criteria as well. As we saw, the cost analysis of U63 contained so many arbitrary elements that it could in fact not decide among the three alternative strategies of expansion. Marshaling, then, the argument of student housing, U63 had the misfortune of greatly exaggerating that problem. Very understandably it did not foresee the dramatic slackening of demand which would occur from 1970 onwards. In the case of U68 we saw its difficulties in applying the vague criteria of regional policy goals to individual choices. Fortunately U68 could resort to the politically determined "primary growth centers." This made its task manageable. Needless to say, its use of this list of possible sites implied a very crucial choice. From the point of view of radical adherents to regional equality, it was an instance of giving to those who already have, disregarding the needs of even more underprivileged areas of Sweden.

There were, as we have seen, interesting differences in the analytic strategies of U63 and U68. The former applied a "technocratic" strategy, trying its best to stay out of politically controversial issues of social equality and regional development. Its proposals were formulated as technical responses to technical problems which every observer could agree existed: exploding student numbers, difficulties of accommodating this pressure in existing institutions, in particular due to a future shortage in student housing. The proposal for university branches appeared natural when existing institutions could not expand and when a sixth university would be too slow a response to current needs. Even when research evidence was available in the form of the study of the impact of higher education on regional economies which U63 had itself commissioned, it refrained from citing it in favor of its proposal for regionalization. The choice of four sites for the new university branches again made no reference to broader considerations of social equality and regional development. They resulted — or so it appeared — from the application of "objective" criteria.

U68, by sharp contrast, did not shy away from these broader considerations in regional policy. On the contrary its analyses aimed at marshaling supportive evidence of the many beneficial impacts of

regionalization. In doing this, it greatly exaggerated the available evidence. Higher education was portrayed as the **primus motor** in regional development. It would without any doubt contribute to greater equality in social class terms. And the choice of sites was also based on such evidence as if such impacts were easily discernable. We may note in this connection that the terms of reference of U68 promised more than the Commission actually delivered. The Commission did not initiate detailed studies of the manpower needs of different regions or of the feasibility of pursuing manpower planning on a regional basis.

Contrary evidence was certainly not discussed by U68 – one reason probably being that little was available. For a decade or more social scientists in Sweden had been engaged in research on regional policy problems. Rarely or never did this research question the optimistic beliefs which permeated regional policy. This was true of the research commissioned by U68 as well. Everybody was not, however, convinced of the rosy picture painted by U68 and the research evidence it marshaled. At about the time of the publication of the Commission's major report, the National Audit Bureau commissioned research on the impact of the university branches on the surrounding community. The study was performed at the Department of Geography of the University of Gothenburg. It was published in 1974, i.e., while the Minister of Education and his staff were preparing the Cabinet Bill. In brief the study concluded that the impact of the university branches had been marginal at best (Pettersson and Pettersson 1974). The study was sent by the National Audit Bureau to the Ministry of Education and has not been heard of since. Later research on the impact of the university branches, both with respect to regional economic development and in terms of their effects on social equality, has confirmed this sceptical view (Fasth 1980; cf. also Hammarberg and Haggstrom 1974).

How can we account for the observed differences in analytical strategies of the three decision-making processes? In the case of the "University of Norrland" the process was extremely incremental, resulting from a series of decisions occurring over a long period. The decisions were small and seemingly independent. Little need for ambitious analysis was felt. With exploding student numbers, and forecasts which told policy-makers that there was much more to come, the decision to create a fifth university was taken very quickly. And, as we have demonstrated, once that decision was taken, the choice of site was evident. No further analysis was needed.

When U63 was appointed, higher education was still largely a non-politicized policy area in Sweden. From the late 1950s the sheer numbers involved, both in terms of students and money, meant that higher education forced itself onto the political agenda. But still there were virtually no controversies of a political party kind. We were all good expansionists. More of the same was the motto. The appointment of U68 five years later marked a turning point in Swedish higher education

politics. Higher education began to be viewed as a means to broad social and political goals. As in other countries students began to question basic features of higher education policy. Perhaps still more important, the big "corporate" interest organizations enthusiastically joined the hitherto quite insulated community of Swedish higher education politics. Particularly TCO, but also LO, would prove to be very influential in the years to come (Premfors 1980; Ruin 1979). As mentioned, they were staunch supporters of regionalization. And they were instrumental in applying ideas of adult and recurrent education to Swedish higher education policy. Their membership would undoubtedly profit considerably from regionalization in combination with an admission policy which placed emphasis on age and work experience. They also believed, and they were probably right, that their status was quite low in the established universities. The new institutions promised a closer relationship and better mutual understanding between trade unions and higher education.

Both U63 and U68 illustrate quite well, I contend, the role of analysis in politics. In complex policy settings analysis inevitably becomes partisan analysis. It is used in a selective way to support the positions of the different interests struggling to gain the upper hand. Specific analyses rarely or never change entrenched policy positions. Even if facts and theories can be introduced which undermine parts of an actor's argument, there almost always remains the possibility of emphasizing other parts. And more often than not analyses are fraught with implicit values and leave opportunities for different interpretations. In the long run, policy analysis and social research may undermine a whole set of arguments and may thus threaten the entire edifice of a policy. But normally this is a slow and complex process, often difficult to even notice in the everyday process of politics as usual.

The regionalization of Swedish higher education has been supported by impressive amounts of policy analysis and social research. Both its basic features and most of its details have, however, been determined by other forces. Many of the policy choices involved can best be explained with reference to very simple decision rules. For example, once regionalization has been decided higher education institutions have been located where there are a sufficient number of applicants. The analysis needed for those decisions is a simple compilation of statistics.

However, even if such a simple "rule-of-thumb" goes a long way in explaining regionalization in higher education, it is not sufficient. Policy developments are best described as outcomes of processes of social interaction, both markets and politics. Market forces have been important in several ways. A particular manifestation in the policy of regionalization was the development of private demand for higher education. As we have seen, both the "University of Norrland" and the four university branches were basically responses to exploding student numbers. Since policy-makers in those days decided not to curb private demand, they simply had to find ways to adjust to it. And in a more basic sense the problems of

regional imbalances are of course due to market forces. The great process of urbanization and the policy responses to it are, in Sweden's mixed economy, predicated on developments which are not controlled through politics.

The political response to such market forces is of course in no way automatic. This is easily proved by a comparison of the greatly varying ambitions in the regional policy of different countries. Few countries have been as ambitious as Sweden. The importance accorded to social equality, the strong belief in the possibilities of rational planning (including regional planning), and the basic fact that political forces epitomizing such values and beliefs were in power, made the regionalization of Swedish higher education possible. Analysis was used to support these developments, but social interaction made them happen.

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Urban Higher Education: Experiences from Germany and Japan

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1. Introduction

The relationship between higher education and the community became a popular topic quite recently. In historical retrospect we find, of course, even in those countries in which this theme was not discussed at all in previous years, many people pointing to the historical routes of this topic, but it certainly would be justified to state that the topic of higher education and the community hardly existed in the late Fifties and early Sixties.

The debate on expansion of higher education and equality of education in the Sixties made everybody aware of the role the regional dispersion of colleges might play. But this does not mean that anybody cared about the interaction between university and community. For example, almost all new universities in the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in the Sixties and Seventies, were furnished with a closed campus outside the city. A quiet place and cheap ground were much more important than any interaction between the university and community. But if somebody considered the university-community relationship at that time, it was in the context of establishing new universities in remote areas, but not about the urban university.

A gradual change of attitude might be observed in the Federal Republic of Germany because of mounting criticism that the universities are too much of a financial burden for society and that the expansion of higher education went far beyond the manpower requirement. Therefore, one cannot address the question of urban universities without looking at the specific historical circumstances and specific roles this topic plays in each country.

The purpose of this paper is to address some aspects of urban universities in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Japan within a comparative context. Before any details about these two cases are presented, it might be appropriate to "map" these cases briefly within the international context. Urban universities — in terms of being located in larger cities and interacting to a considerable extent with the urban community — are more likely to be found,

a. if higher education of a country does not rely on residential colleges; in countries favoring residential colleges we find many of these institutions in smaller towns;

b. if a country is fairly or strongly centralized: a "congestion" of students, such as in Paris or Tokyo, is significant for a centralized country (and, of course, supported by that fact that both countries, as opposed to England, do not rely on residential colleges);

c. if the local elite has a considerable impact on the decision making processes of the university;

d. if the universities, being under pressure as far as their traditional functions are concerned, seek to extend their functions. For example, if the universities nowadays face a shortage of students or are blamed for serving "over-education" and seeking to attract "new students," for offering adult education and various services to the community.

Both countries under consideration here did not prefer residential colleges; therefore, they are open, in principle, to the cities. The decentralized Germany always had universities spread all over the country, whereas in Japan, a highly centralized country, most universities were located at a few large places. In both countries, we do not see any strong impact of the local elite on the university. In addition, universities in both countries did not face a shortage of students in recent decades. Therefore, we find universities in both countries which do not exclude the notion of an "urban university," but at the same time it is not surprising to find that we do not observe such a notion up to now.

2. The Urban University in the Federal Republic of Germany

(1) Many German universities were neither located at the administrative nor at the commercial centers of the country, but at somewhat remote university towns: Tubingen, Gottingen and Marburg are known examples. The life at these places was to a considerable extent shaped by the university. This, however, changed gradually in the 19th and 20th centuries.

(2) In 1980, 28 per cent of all students were enrolled at institutions of higher education at five major cities of the Federal Republic of Germany as demonstrated in Table 1. The inhabitants of these cities comprise 10 per cent of the population of that country.

(3) In the post-war expansion of higher education, all German universities grew at a rapid pace. This does not hold true for the elite universities in the U.S., Japan and some other countries, where this growth was left to other institutions or the establishment of new institutions. As Table 2 shows, the number of students at universities located in large cities increased almost at the same rates as in intermediate cities and at a faster speed than in small towns. Of the six large universities now, each surpassing 30,000 students, four are located in major cities.

(4) Phenomena of cultural enrichment of the community through the university, an impact of "student life" on the community, etc. had been more visible in smaller towns. There was a trend, however, for students to prefer a big city which to some extent offered the character of a university town but at the same time included a metropolitan environment.

(5) There has not been any research on the environment of large universities as there has been on small universities. All information available stresses very bureaucratic and anonymous relationships at large universities, which are, as mentioned above, primarily located in big cities.

(6) After a student selects a university, he or she does not necessarily want to be employed in that area after graduation. In the process of increasing difficulties in finding jobs and of decreasing regional mobility the enrollment at an urban university might be advantageous for access to certain jobs. At the same time, however, the high number of students in large cities forces a considerable number of students to find a job somewhere else; this became more difficult because of the same process of regionalization. For example, universities of Berlin have enlarged as part

Table 1

Total Number of Students at Institutions of Higher Education at Five Large Cities in the Federal Republic of Germany 1980

City	Number of Students
Berlin	76,700
Munchen	72,201
Koln	59,971
Hamburg	50,949
Frankfurt	30,063
Total	289,884
Percentage of all students in the Federal Republic of Germany	28%
Inhabitants of five cities Population of the F.R. of Germany	10%

Source: Based on Bundesminister for Bildung und Wissenschaft: *Grund- und Strukturdaten 1981/82*. Bonn: BMBW 1981.

of an investment policy for the cultural and scientific life of that city which suffers economically from its politically isolated location. This policy had rested on the assumption that universities do not furnish a primarily local, but a primarily national market. There are, however, indications that graduates from that city now face mounting difficulties in getting a job.

(7) Large cities are attractive for graduates who are either unemployed or taking various side jobs instead of being fully employed. The number of persons neither officially employed nor officially unemployed seems to grow substantially. Most of them prefer to live in big cities, many of them being nominally enrolled at universities. The phenomenon supports the development of a specific "sub-culture" in large cities.

(8) Student protests have been more visible in urban areas, especially Berlin and Frankfurt. This is partly due to the fact that students who are interested in politics and society are more likely to choose an urban university. The student protest, however, obviously did not improve the relationships between the university and the community.

Table 2

Students at Select West German Universities by Size of City

	1955	1965	1980
a. **Large Cities (500,000 and more):**			
Average	8,449	16,613	36,521
FU Berlin	8,772	15,438	42,929
Frankfurt	12,016	22,574	24,683
Hamburg	6,765	15,206	36,499
Koln	9,521	18,711	36,495
Munchen	12,016	22,574	41,997
b. **Intermediate Cities (100,000 — 500,000):**			
Average	4,428	10,032	22,842
Bonn	7,122	13,208	34,399
Freiburg	5,145	10,905	19,127

Heidelberg	5,323	10,944	21,563
Kiel	2,136	6,416	14,039
Mainz	3,598	7,944	22,309
Munster	6,145	14,665	38,662
Nurnberg-Erlangen	3,694	9,143	19,103
Wurzburg	2,262	7,030	13,537
c. **Small towns (less than 100,000):**			
Average	4,766	9,187	19,148
Gottingen	4,905	9,995	28,834
Marburg	4,216	7,929	12,705
Tubingen	5,177	9,643	19,904

Source: Based on W. Albert and Ch. Oehler: *Materialien zur Entwicklung der Hochschulen 1950 bis 1967*, Hannover: Hochschul-Informations-System 1969; Bundesminister fur Bildung und Wissenschaft: *Grund-und Strukturdaten* 1981/82, Bonn: BMBWZ 1981.

(9) In recent years, German universities have been under growing pressure of legitimation. Many of them chose closer interactions with the region. We find more adult education programs, counseling services and cooperation in research and development: among the most recent developments many universities have established offices for technology transfers.

There are increasing measures to support that kind of interaction. One interesting scheme might be explained briefly: the state of Berlin inaugurated a fund for research on regional matters: university teachers who are willing to coordinate such a project might apply and receive funds to employ unemployed university graduates on a financial basis higher than unemployment compensation and lower than ordinary employment.

One has to note, though, that these active policies of regionalization can be found more frequently and extensively among new universities. Elder universities in large cities are less active up to the present.

(10) In general, universities in the Federal Republic of Germany did not care very much about their relationships to the region. The general mood has changed substantially in recent years. But universities are very slow in changing their attitudes: also the regions are by no means enthusiastic

about the cooperation with universities, and in many cases rhetoric exceeds reality by far. There are very few traditions and measures to support close cooperation between the university and the community. Whereas at small places, limited activities as well as a diffuse impact of university on the regions may be easily visible, the universities in the larger cities are still far away from being what might be called an "urban university."

3. The Urban University in Japan

(1) The concentration of universities at a few major metropolitan areas in Japan is very high: there are more than 100 universities in Tokyo and about the same number of non-university-level institutions of higher education. The total number of students in the capital of Japan exceeds 700,000; there are about one million students in the urban transportation area of Tokyo. In the last two decades the number of students in Kyoto/Osaka/Kobe area, the second metropolitan area of Japan, reached almost two thirds of the Tokyo figures.

(2) The government policy has been to establish elite universities at Tokyo and Kyoto first and then a few additional institutions in other large areas. In addition it set up professional or vocational colleges for the local public needs, e.g. teacher training, medicine, etc. After World War II, these local colleges were merged into universities. In addition to the half-centralized elite universities, the decentralized state universities for public local needs, a few centralized special universities and a few public universities financed by major cities, the private universities became the most important sector in quantitative terms: more than 3/4 of Japanese students are enrolled at private institutions of higher education. The most prestigious one and the largest ones are located in the two metropolitan areas, most of them in Tokyo. There has been, however, a spread of new private universities to other areas since about 1960. As Table 3 shows, the percentage of students being enrolled at institutions in Tokyo declined in the last decades, whereas this share remained constant in the Osaka area and increased in other areas.

Table 3

Institution of Higher Education and Students in Tokyo and Kyoto/Osaka/Kobe 1960—80

	Tokyo	Kyoto/Osaka/Kobe	Total Japan
a. **Universities**			
1960	82 (33%)	48 (20%)	245 (100%)

1970	103 (27%)	77 (20%)	382 (100%)
1980	103 (23%)	82 (18%)	446 (100%)

b. **Junior Colleges**

1960	74 (26%)	63 (22%)	280 (100%)
1970	89 (19%)	80 (17%)	479 (100%)
1980	85 (16%)	86 (17%)	517 (100%)

c. **Undergraduate Students at Universities (in 1,000)**

1960	300 (48%)	125 (20%)	626 (100%)
1970	626 (45%)	280 (20%)	1,406 (100%)
1980	628 (34%)	360 (20%)	1,836 (100%)

d. **Students at Junior Colleges (in 1,000)**

1960	30 (36%)	16 (19%)	83 (100%)
1970	74 (28%)	48 (18%)	263 (100%)
1980	79 (21%)	77 (21%)	371 (100%)

Source: Ministry of Education, Japan

(3) During the Fifties and Sixties the increase of student numbers at private universities in the metropolitan area was a comfortable way for the government to cope with the rising aspirations of youth without substantial financial burdens. In the Seventies, however, government became concerned about the low standards at private institutions and established a system to subsidize private institutions under the condition that they do not further increase the student intake. At the same time the public concern about congestion, pollution and other deterioration of living conditions led the government to consider policies of decentralization. In this context the higher education study group advising the minister of education suggested establishing more state universities in disadvantaged regions. A study of the regional planning agency suggested a few years later close cooperation between different government agencies in order to take into consideration more strongly regional aspects in higher education planning.

(4) One step towards decentralization has been the establishment of the Tsukuba University outside the Tokyo area, thereby relocating one of the major Tokyo universities. The government's plan of decentralization was more or less given up after the oil crisis.

(5) The huge crowd of students in Tokyo and in the Osaka areas creates a new quality of interaction between universities and the region otherwise unknown. To mention a few examples only:

-There is a long bookshop road in Tokyo—an impressive center of bookshops which is unique in size
-A daily magazine publishing only ads for part-time jobs for students can be bought at any newspaper booth in Tokyo.
-One private railway firm presented the whole ground for the campus of a new university at the outskirts of Tokyo. Now the students take the otherwise empty trains from the city to the suburbs and in the afternoon from the suburbs to the city, which return from taking people from home to work and back during rush hours, and thereby pay back that gift.

(6) Student life in a large city is more attractive for Japanese students than for students of many other countries, because the period of study is a more exceptional phase than in Western industrial societies. After the pressure of the "examination hell" for entering higher education and before the work at a company which will organize his life far beyond the working hours, the period of being enrolled at university is a very important stage of compensation: the large city promises the desired freedom.

(7) The choice of a certain university is not only very important for certification of a certain rank which to a large extent determines the range of positions open to the graduates, but also universities — especially the private ones — are very active in placing graduates. As Japan is highly centralized and decisions frequently rely on personal contacts, admission to a university in a metropolitan area is considered to give an edge on the labor market.

(8) Also university professors prefer to live in congested areas because their opportunities to get their books published, to receive research funds, to do part-time lecturing at other universities or tutoring, to advise government agencies, etc., are far better in the metropolitan areas, partly because of the importance of personal acquaintance in Japan.

(9) The large private sector, the pragmatic approach of various universities and the additional activities of the teaching staff create some ties between higher education and the community. As higher education is more highly appreciated in Japan than in most countries as a prerequisite for careers, people know much more about the universities in their home city than probably anywhere else.

Nonetheless universities seem to be fairly separated from the local surroundings:

-In many cases, the campus is almost self-sufficient in offering cafeteria, food store, barber shop, travel services, etc.; the vicinity does not seem to gain very much from the universities.

Table 4

Expectations and Needs of the Community Residents Towards Hiroshima University — Survey Undertaken in 1978

32.1%	wish to see the university hospital made more accessible.
24.2%	desire greater access to the university grounds and swimming pools.
21.5%	desire unrestricted access to the university library.
16.8%	desire a preferential admission policy for children from the community.
13.5%	wish to see the university accept part-time students.
10.6%	wish to see the university increase open lectures.
7.3%	desire the establishment of an adult education department.
5.8%	wish to see classes held for community residents during holidays.
5.5%	desire expanded evening classes.

Source: Higher Education and the Community = A Summary Report. Hiroshima: Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University 1980, p. 6.

A survey of the relationship between the university and the region (see Table 4) shows that the people of the region hardly expect more than a joint use of university sport facilities and halls.

Therefore, the concept of "urban university" can only remain vague in Japan up to the present. There are increasing activities on the part of the universities to establish close ties to the community, for example the increase in number of extension courses. Since Japanese universities are at present under much less pressure than most universities in Western societies to legitimize their role, the process of opening the universities to the community probably will be slow.

Regionalization in West Germany

Post-Secondary Institutions

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1. Introduction

Most politicians and experts looking back on the development of higher education in the last two decades tend to rely on pessimistic overtones. Wishes have hardly been fulfilled, no matter whether one addresses structural and curricular reform, decision-making structures or the impact of expanded higher education on the labor market. There are, however, exceptions: in 1965, Clemens Geissler published a brochure on higher education and the region; he proved that the quota of youth transferring to institutions of higher education is far below average in regions without any university.[1] He suggested establishing about 30 new universities in addition to the approximately 50 universities existing at that time in the Federal Republic of Germany. At present, we can find an institution of higher education in more than 90 per cent of the regions he suggested. Regionalization in West-German post-secondary institutions: a success story? My conclusion is: the increasing of opportunities to study in all regions was successful. In addition, a true regionalization, a regionalization beyond the stage of universities just being in a region and offering opportunities to study, stimulating the regional economy and guaranteeing some kind of cultural enrichment through the effects of consumption is just beginning to develop.

2. Regionalization through the Establishment of New Universities

The first step towards regionalization of higher education was the establishment of new universities. The Science Council named 25 new universities including comprehensive universities, founded in the Sixties and Seventies.[2] Almost all of them had been founded in the process of expansion of higher education in order to reduce regional disparities of opportunities for enrollment.

Certainly, strenuous efforts have been necessary to establish these institutions. If there has not been a strong political will to regionalize higher education, a further expansion of the existing universities would have been much more likely.

At the same time, however, one has to note a slower development of new universities than expected. The total number of students at the 25 new universities was 147,815 in 1979/80, 20 per cent of all students at university-level institutions of higher education in the Federal Republic of

Germany.[3] This number has to be considered small, if one takes into account, that the number of students at seven major universities (Free University of Berlin, Universities of Bonn, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Koln, Munchen and Munster) increased from 111,000 in 1965 to 255,000 in 1980; this increase of 144,000 by far exceeds the total number of new study places at the 25 new universities, which partly incorporate forerunner-institutions.

The slow growth of student numbers at new universities is to some extent a consequence of time-consuming process of planning, implementation, financing and construction. In addition, new universities are less popular among applicants than the older ones. This could be demonstrated by figures on competition rates in *numerus clausus* fields of study. A further source might be the student-capacity-ratio shown in Chart 1. According to a general formula based on space, the capacity of each university is calculated: the number of students which ought not to be surpassed under normal circumstances in order to secure proper learning conditions. As Chart 1 shows, there are only two new universities (see the asterisks in front of the names) — Duisburg and Kassel — among the first ten universities which have an "overload" of at least 150 per cent. Among the botton ten universities — each having less than 100 per cent, there are nine new universities.

A recent survey on the choice of universities[4] indicates that the quality and prestige expected is only one of major factors. In addition, students appreciate highly the living environment of larger cities as well as of some traditional university towns. In addition, less popular fields of study, such as teacher training, are over-represented in new universities. Therefore it is justified to summarize, that the process of regionalization in terms of increasing student numbers at new universities in disadvantaged regions was much slower than expected, partly because the majority of new institutions were not successful in attracting students.

3. Comprehensive University Areas: An Unsuccessful Attempt

Expansion of higher education has been a more or less continuous process from the early Fifties until now, whereas the arguments in favor of the critique of the process frequently changed. Until the mid-Sixties, policy in favor of expansion was conceived to be necessary in order to re-establish a sound system of higher education after the disruptions of the Nazi and World War II era. In the late Sixties and early Seventies expansion was conceived as a measure to increase equality of opportunity and to stimulate economic growth. Since the mid-Seventies it has been justified as a legal right to choose education freely and as a matter of justice for the generation belonging to the demographic peak, in spite of serious doubts so far as manpower requirements are concerned.

When measures for the expansion were understood as an active policy to increase equality of opportunity and to stimulate economic growth, a consensus among experts developed that this growth policy meant a

reduction of unit costs — of the total expenditures for each student. In addition, some experts came to the conclusion that many graduates would take over jobs previously not held by university graduates and that universities should prepare them for changing job tasks.

In 1967, a committee established by the Ministry of Education of Baden-Wurttemberg proposed the introduction of comprehensive universities. All universities and non-university level institutions of higher education of each region would be merged into one institution in order to coordinate resources and to have a permeable system of various study courses.[5] During the next few years many proposals were forwarded to establish close links between university and non-university courses of study, as will be discussed in the next section.

According to some proposals, 50—80 higher education institution regions (Hochschulregionen) or comprehensive university areas (Gesamthochschulregionen) would be established in order to set up planning devices for the cooperation or merger of the neighbouring institutions of higher education. In Nordrhein-Westfalen and Baden-Wurttemberg, the government divided the total state according to which governments and institutions of higher education would cooperate in preparing the foundation of a comprehensive university. Federal and state governments agreed in 1972 to support six so-called "model experiments" for the purpose of higher education innovation. Thereby a financial basis — including planning staff — was given for the preparatory process of establishing comprehensive universities in the Aachen, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Osnabruck, Stuttgart and Ulm areas.[6]

The planning activities in these higher education institution regions or comprehensive university areas were terminated — the last one in 1980 — without leading to the establishment of any comprehensive university in those places. In a few cases, the institutions of higher education established joint service units (for example student guidance centers, higher education didactics centers). In Hamburg a few courses of study jointly sponsored by two institutions of higher education were established. Hamburg is the exceptional case of planning bodies for the establishment of a comprehensive university still being in existence.

There have been many factors involved in the failure of the policy of merging institutions of higher education:[7] many university representatives of vocational colleges were afraid of playing only a marginal role in these new institutions; there was a reluctance to reduce the gap between the traditions of the univeristy education and the vocational approaches at Fachhochschulen; the majority of employers preferred distinct profiles between univesity graduates on the one hand and graduates of vocational colleges on the other; many other arguments could be cited.

In this context, it ought to be mentioned that the debate on comprehensive university areas hardly reflected the relationships between the institutions of higher education and the region. At that time, regionalization primarily meant additional opportunities to study,

Chart 1

Rank	University
1.	Berlin, FU
2.	Bonn
3.	Mainz
4.	Munchen, U
5.	Munster
6.	Aachen
7.	*DUISBURGH
8.	Koln
9.	Berlin, TU
10.	*KASSEL
11.	Freiburg
12.	*ESSEN
13.	*PADERBORN
14.	Frankfurt
15.	Hamburg, U
	Munchen, TU
16.	*OLDENBURG
17.	Hannover
18.	Erlanger-Nurnberg
19.	*KAISERSLAUTERN
20.	Saarbrucken
21.	*BREMEN
	Tubingen
22.	*EICHSTATT
23.	Wurzburg
24.	*DORTMUND
25.	SIEGEN
26.	Heidelberg
27.	Gottingen
	Karlsruhe
28.	*WUPPERTAL
29.	*BOCHUM
	Mannheim
30.	Braunschweig
31.	*LONEBURG
32.	*OSNABROCK
33.	Darmstadt
34.	Gieben
	Stuttgart
35.	Hohenheim
36.	*BAMBERG
37.	Clausthal
38.	Kiel
	*ULM
39.	*BAYREUTH
40.	*HILDESHEIM
41.	*TRIER
42.	*REGENSBURG
43.	Marburg
44.	*DOSSELDORF
45.	*AUGSBURG
	*PASSAU
46.	*BIELEFELD
47.	*KONSTANZ

Source: Based on data compiled by the Science Council, cited in H. Peisert et al.: Studienortwahl und Entwicklungsprobleme neuer Universitaten, Konstanz 1981, mimo.

additional consumption effects in the region, etc. Mergers of institutions could only support these goals, if they helped somehow to economize. As universities either did not believe in the possibility of economizing or feared losses for themselves, their resistance is not surprising.

Chart 2

A Model of Principles of Regionalization of Higher Education

Character of Higher Education Institutions	Needs for Higher Education: specific according to region	Needs for Higher Education: general
different between regions	Principle of regional service	Principle of division of labour
equal in all regions		Principle of balancing disparities

Source: Uwe Heine, Ulrich Teichler and Bernd Wollenweber: *Perspektiven der Hochschulentwicklung in Bremen*. Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum fur Berufs- und Hochschulforschung 1980, pp. 20—22.

5. **Principles of Regionalization: A Conceptual Framework**

In order to explain the basic change of policies regarding the relationships between higher education and the region, I want to introduce a conceptual frame of regional planning of higher education.[10] As pointed out in chart 2, strategies of regionalization might differ

- according to the needs they want to serve,
- according to the character of the institution of higher education under consideration as compared to other institutions of higher education.

According to both dimensions, regionalization might mean considering solutions in this region or considering general solutions.

This abstract model might be illuminated by explaining the three

strategies identified:

(a) The aim of the principle of balancing disparities is to establish institutions of higher education in underprivileged regions which ought to be as close a possible to the average pattern of universities. Based on the assumptions that the needs of society regarding higher education are more or less the same within a nation and that these needs are more likely to be satisfied, if there is a university close by, the aim is to offer all regions the same opportunity to receive the same kind of service.

(b) The aim of the principle of regional service is to provide special services to the region which fit the specific needs of that region. It is based on the assumption that there exist specific needs, either in terms of different patterns of basically the same needs (for example more agriculture, less industry) or in terms of uniqueness (the cultural heritage of that region). It considers it appropriate for a university to base its planning on these specific needs.

(c) According to the principle of division of labour (between the institutions of higher education) it is not possible and/or desirable to shape all institutions according to the national average and to promote a self-reliance of a region as far as services by the university system are concerned. For example it would not be feasible to establish 'small' fields of study according to the number of jobs available for graduates of that field (for example Japanese studies) at every university. A better quality of the services of higher education for the region could be secured, if all regions "import" some services and "export" others to other regions. Arguments of that kind usually do not stress specific needs of a region, but the principle might be applicable to different regional patterns of basically the same needs: it might be considered appropriate to establish only one specific program of engineering for two regions in need of that skill — for example mining areas — at only one university in order to secure a broad and qualified program at all.

In addition one has to take into account that regionalization might address

- the input of the higher education institutions (the opportunity to study,
- the spill-over effects of higher education institutions (economic consumption effects and cultural enrichment without direct institutional measures to establish cultural programs),
- the output of higher education institutions (providing graduates, technologies, counselling services, cultural programs, etc.)

All of these three aspects refer to the three principles mentioned.

6. Recent Trends of Regionalization

The major thrust of regionalization of higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany during the late Sixties and the early Seventies has

been to follow the principle of balancing disparities in terms of the input of students. This has been a very important policy, because there was a general trend towards enrolling at a university in the vicinity; in addition, many "new" students would not have enrolled at all, if there were not a university available in the vicinity. The new universities, however, did not grow to an extent which comes close to a real balance, as has been discussed earlier.

It was expected that a policy of balancing disparities in terms of the input would also lead to a balancing in terms of spill-over effects. There were effects in this direction; one survey showed, however, that the poorer a region is, the higher the percentage of university expenditures which will be spent outside the region.[11]

The regionalization of higher educationof that period did not, however, follow only one principle. In terms of input and spill-over effects, the principle of the division of labour prevailed. One did not care to offer fields of subjects according to the national average or according to local needs, but according to priorities on national level; for example, teacher training at new univerisities was increased because of presumed shortage, whereas medicine was not established at new regional universities because of financial considerations. This shows on the one hand, that the opportunity to study meant just the opportunity to enroll, no matter what field of study. It shows on the other hand, that an inter-regional import and export of graduates was taken for granted.

This policy of following two principles proved to be contradictory. In addition, some conditions have changed which are prone to affect policies of higher education regarding the region:

- The more the trend of students to continue choosing the university in the vicinity, the less a university in a remote area offering only a small range of field of studies will be able to balance regional disparities in terms of opportunities to study.

- Students became more and more immobile — as in society at large — in choosing jobs. Inter-regional imports and exports of graduates became more and more difficult. This led to a worsening of the positions of graduates in an era characterized by a very high over-representation of students on the one hand and increasing difficulties for remote areas to attract graduates of fields of study not provided at the local university.

- If regional mobility is low, it seems to be more appropriate to "match" the programs to the manpower requirements. This opens eyes for the local needs on the the labor market.

- To some extent the universities lost their acceptance in society. Equality of opportunity in education lost its political priority; at the same time, the view became dominant that the expansion of higher education led to an oversupply of graduates. These changes gradually challenged West German universities to consider extending their services — further education, technology transfer,[12] counseling, etc. All these services depend on short "routes of delivery" or at least are likely to be more successful if

the region is considered.

Therefore, it is not surprising to observe West German universities "discovering" the region now, which previously has been neglected given the cosmopolitan approach of universities and the prevailing policy and planning principles. One also observes not surprisingly this shift of emphasis primarily among the new univerisites.

There are, however, many obstacles: many of them — for example the fear of being considered second-rank institutions, if one cares about the region — are phenomena which can be considered international. There are two obstacles, though, inherited from the previous policies which finally ought to be mentioned here:

(a) The new universities could serve the regional needs better and could balance disparities in terms offering qualified manpower for the region better, if the range of fields of study was broader. They suffer now from the fact that the establishment of fields of study in the Sixties and Seventies followed neither the principle of balancing disparities nor the local needs, but was based on the principle of division of labor.
(b) The planning processes give a preponderance to national goals — including balancing disparities which is — according to the constitution — a Federal concern, but tend to neglect specific regional interests. For example, 50 per cent of each new university building is paid by the Federal government after having been approved by the Science Council and the Planning Committee for the Construction of Higher Education. This precludes a dominance of regional approaches which might contradict the other principles.

At a period of abundant resources, principles of higher education prevailed which did not care about specific needs of the region. At the moment specific needs of the region are taken seriously, but there is no way of receiving sufficient resources and changing the planning models. Therefore, it might be justified to predict that universities will be more eager to serve specific needs of the region in addition to having a policy of balancing disparities. However, this policy will be less successful than the previous one of combining a policy of balancing disparities only in terms offering opportunities to enroll and a policy of division of labor in terms of graduates and job, because there are fewer possibilities now to shift resources according to the preferred policies.

Footnotes

1. Clemens Geissler: *Hochschulstandorte — Hochschulbesuch*, Hannover 1965.
2. Wissenschaftsrat: *Ausbaustand und Entwicklungsbedingungen neuer Hochschulen*, Koln 1980, p. 15.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Hansgert Peisert et al.: Studienortwahl und Entwicklungsprobleme neuer Universitaten, Konstanz 1981, mimeo.
5. Kultusministerium Baden-Wurttemberg: *Hochschulgesamtplan Baden-Surttemberg: Bericht des Arbeitskreises Hochschulgesamtplan*, Villingen: Neckar-Verlag 1967.
6. See Rupert Eilsberger and Ludwig Gieseke: "Die Gesamthochschulentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *ad acta*, No. 1, 1978, pp. 1—33.
7. See Bund-Lander-Kommission fur Bildungsplanung und Forschungsforderung: Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe "Modellversuche im Hochschulbereich" Uber die Modellversuche zur Gesamthochschulentwicklung, Bonn 1977, mimeo; Helmut Winkler: *Zur Theorie und Praxis der Gesamthochschulplanung*, Munchen: Minerva 1978.
8. See the overview on comprehensive universities in Ladislav Cerych, Ayla Neusel, Ulrich Teichler and Helmut Winkler: *Gesamthochschule — Erfahrungen, Hemmnisse, Zielwandel*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 1981; for a shorter account see Ladislav Cerych et. al.: *Implementation of Higher Education Reforms: the German Gesamthochschule*, Paris: Institute of Education, European Cultural Foundation 1981.
9. See Ulrich Teichler: "Institutionalizing Education-Work Interaction Programs — The Case of the Comprehensive University of Kassel," in *Journal of Cooperative Education*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, 1981.
10. See Uwe Heine, Ulrich Teichler and Bernd Wollenweber: *Perspektiven der Hochschulentwicklung in Bremen*, Kassel: Wissenschaftliches Zentrum fur Berufs- und Hochschulforschung 1980; Ulrich Teichler: "Regionaler und uberregionaler Bezug der Hochschulen im Wandel," in Paul Kellermann (ed.): *Universitat und Umland*, Klagenfurth: Karntner Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft 1982, pp. 15—39.
11. Clemens Geissler, Gerhard Engelbrech and Joachim Kutz: "Regionalisierung des Hochschulsystems," in Kellermann, op. cit., pp. 40—69.
12. See for example Peter Meyer-Dohm: "Wissenschaftstransfer — mehr als ein Denkspiel," in *Deutsche Universitatszeitung*, No. 4/81, 1981, pp. 118—122.

Problems of The Urban University: Great Britain and U.S.A.

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My first task is to bring greetings from Britain to a distinguished university in one of the world's great cities. New York may seem often to present a spectroscope of most of life's problems: it has also been the site of many of the world's best efforts to reinforce the ability of people to change themselves and society.

My acquaintance with New York began more than 20 years ago when, as a Harkness Fellow, I was one of the many Europeans who benefitted from American benevolence. At that time, in 1960 and 1961, although many issues were familiar, they were not quite the same. The attacks on racial inequality and discrimination were being intensified but not yet at their peak. The academic system seemed wonderfully optimistic and geared to an expanding economy and an opportunity laden society. Small teachers' colleges were on their way to becoming vast universities. Only later did the enormous cracks in the American social and academic fabric appear under the stress of Vietnam and the deeply perplexing radical dissent of the young of the late 1960's.

The Problem of the City Setting

Many of these contemporary problems are conflated in the problems of the urban university. I have to say, however, that the problems are far more sharp in the U.S.A. than in Britain. Indeed, one of our policy analysts (Blackstone, 1980) wrote that "if all new universities had been built in the inner city instead of sited in the country . . . this would have helped provide some inner city areas with a more socially mixed population". On the contrary, we have the problem of the suburban or green field campus, built on cheap land, some way out of the centres of cities. Their danger is a kind of suburban dullness and stillness as mobility becomes more expensive. Nor, for that matter, have we regarded the great city as wicked. There was not a conscious search for a pastoral setting. Quite a deal of our academic pride and joy is devoted to large city universities although they are always a bit off the centre. So the problem of urbanness is partly a genuine American problem and partly a proxy for other and, I feel, deeper issues to which this talk is mainly attended.

Such authors as Berube (1978) argue that American universities in their period of enormous expansion became big undertakings — he would say

businesses — eating up housing and amenity space without much concern for the ecologies which they undermined. At the same time, this version says, they preserved a privileged academicism which deprived minorities of higher education and kept it largely irrelevant to the mass of the population of the areas in which they were sited. He and others therefore urge that the universities should exercise far more of a service function. More than that, however, the service function should be defined not by those appointed through the traditional academic modes or through traditional ballot box systems but at the instance of the deprived and sometimes insurgent groups in the larger society.

The picture of the university and some of the problems that its expansion caused is consistent with other conceptualizations of the urbanisation problem. Mollenkopf (1981) refers to themes that conflict as large cities grow. There are cycles of order and disorder, opportunity and deprivation, growth and decay. A developmental cycle leads from periods of organisational expansion into periods of conflict and breakdown which, in turn, generate new forms of expansion. Moreover, cities contain and must contain two conflicting kinds of relationship — those of production and economic accumulation and those of social interaction and community. Accumulation enables society to create, expand and distribute its means of wellbeing. It is based on market values. Community develops bonds between people enabling them to trust in and rely on each other.

But neither of those two urban themes, accumulation and community, sits easily with the definitions of the university in its classic form. Searle (1972) depicts the university as an institution with specialist functions. Kerr, too, writes of the multiversity whose primary function is production of knowledge, a viewpoint echoed and substantiated by Trow. Primarily and essentially, the university has been concerned with individual development within the boundaries of accumulated knowledge and skills within which individuals compete against criteria of excellence. That is the idealized view enunciated by Cardinal Newman (or Barzun (1968)). This does not mean that the academic expects his own functions and values to be irreconcilable with service functions or other secondary functions. But individual development, rather than communitarian, or accumulation themes, are those which the academic predominantly espouses.

In the U.S.A., whatever the feelings of academics, the willing acceptance of the need to expand higher education brought accumulation, of property and plant and of scope, into conflict with urban community ideals. At the time all of this was happening we were still learning how difficult it was to operate the urban environment effectively and fairly. How painfully have we learnt of the cost of urban motorways, high rise apartments, and of large institutions. They seemed to be the vehicles of opportunity and mobility in the 1950's and 1960's. University administrators who thought they were advancing the opportunities of the American young and of society at large by expanding the urban universities, aroused unexpected conflicts.

But the second theme contained in the radical critique of the urban university raises even more fundamental issues. The demands for wider access to the metropolitan university, on the recognisances offered by new groups seeking admission rather than those of the academic gate keepers, lead us to ask who sets values and who has power in higher education.

Government and Content

Let me first sketch the different tradition of academic content before moving on to patterns of governance. In all democratic countries questions of content of education tie intimately with questions of control. The traditional model of academic excellence, of individual creativity for both teacher and student is still strong in every educational system although it no longer monopolises the values market.

It is based largely on an internalist concept of knowledge. There are truths to be discovered, tested, improved and restated. The truths are mediated through the painfully acquired skills of professionally trained academics. Truths from outside academe must pass through the gateways of academic knowledge. Where problems do not start with disciplines but with domains of concern — issues of educational policy, or of the city, or of ethnic relations — even then, while the question is set and partly answered by reference groups wider than academics because the client groups and practitioners also come in, there is also, nonetheless, a boundary set by the academic who can discern when an issue is political or normative rather than evidential and academic.

The second model of academic content has emphasised the instrumental functions of higher education which, again classically, have been to produce skilled manpower, the elite groups that society needs for both economic and social processes. British universities have been moderately responsive to social demands and in two ways. Increasingly after the war they became more meritocratic and opened their doors to the able as much as to the privileged. As Sanderson (1972) so well depicts, British universities were quite successful in doing two things at once. They kept true to their academic purpose whilst responding to the perceived needs of industry, commerce and society. Where there was a struggle, the struggle was largely internal and academics could either accept or reject demands from the outside.

Britain has been far less competent at pursuing the third model, as expressed so cogently in the recent histories of urban dissent, which takes on board communitarian concepts of higher education which will be far more open to larger groups in society. In Britain, the case for wider access has hardly been seriously taken on board. At present, between 12 and 13 per cent of each age group go to institutions, some of which are not universities, conferring first degrees. We have provided alternative forms of higher education in our 30 polytechnics. But they, too, are criticised for apeing the academic styles of the universities in both their curriculum and

in their patterns of access.

Access in Britain remains a sharp and major issue. The participation of working class students in universities has recently shown a marked decline and the polytechnics have not retained the attractiveness to working class children which the colleges from which they originated had. Women's participation has increased but that is because of wider social change rather than the expansion of opportunities within higher education. The reduction in the number of places in teacher training courses has reduced certain aspects of women's opportunity. Moreover, since our government is now determined to reduce the number of places in higher education, institutions are likely to avoid risk as they allocate places. (Fulton, 1982).

There is not likely to be a determined effort to recruit more adult students who are the obvious clientele for higher education expansion. And here I am reminded that it was the 1909 that City College initiated a degree program allowing people to take courses at night. (Ruyle, 1981).

Essentially, therefore, in Britain we have maintained the classic model of higher education. We have extended it to allow for somewhat wider access but it still remains hovering between the elite and the mass rather than universal access. And now, in Britain, we have government policies that will retard a broadening of objectives and wider access for the different groups.

Educational policy is caving in under economic depression and a withdrawal of political support for its more liberal objectives. I do not blame Conservative governments for being reactionary; that is what Conservative governments are for. But neither do we have, I must add, an adequate intellectual critique or paradigms embodying notions of what is to be valued and what is needed.

While I was sunning myself at Berkeley last year, the British government got up to mischief. They declared their intention of reducing the university undergraduate population by about 15,000 places out of roughly a quarter of a million. Similar reductions will take place in the non-university sector. This is to happen in two years so, as a result, perhaps, four or five thousand tenured academics will lose their jobs, most of them this autumn. So much for British moderation and gradualism. It would take professional skills, which I do not possess, to analyse fully the reasons for the government's decision. Certainly, the number of youngsters coming through the school system will radically decline by the mid 1980's. But most of us would argue that the recruitment rate is already abysmally low in Britain, that the schools, in spite of the curses thrown at them by their critics, are producing very many more students each year with appropriate qualification for higher education, and that higher education is a better way of absorbing young people's time than waiting, on unemployment benefit, for a job that might not happen.

Access is not only to be reduced, but, although British investment in science and technology education is high as a proportion of the whole, reductions in social sciences and humanities are being ordained. We might

reasonably ask whether it is really British engineering or British social relationships which account for the economic state in which Britain finds itself.

Governance and Objectives

Until recently, the British pattern of university government was a model for all higher education systems where the bulk of the funds came from public money. We seemed to be able to get it right. We seemed to be able to reconcile, in Trow's useful distinction (1975) the needs of the public and the private life of higher education. There was a healthy tension between those engaged in higher education directly and those who had a stake in it without being completely of it.

Becher and I (1980) in common with such scholars as Clark (1982) noted the ways in which the British and other systems could reconcile two apparently conflicting institutional characteristics.

We assumed that the basic unit of a higher education institution, usually a teaching department, sustained certain norms connected with the protection and development of disciplines through peer group mechanisms. The peer group mechanisms also respected the intellectual self-satisfactions and drives of the individual teacher or researcher. Higher education classically nurtures the basic units and the individuals within them and thus encourages divergence, individuality or even intellectual deviance. The institution, in this picture, acts as a kind of holding company for the real actors in the basic units. Increasingly, we may recognise how the institution has self-justifying norms of its own concerned with the total range that it will offer to both the world of scholarship and to its more immediate constituencies and communities and to the providing authorities, particularly if they are national funders such as we have in Britain. The institution also is concerned with the maintenance of academic due process over assessment procedures, appointments of staff and so on.

The dichotomy between a basic unit defending academic norms, part of an invisible college going beyond its own institution, and central government has been acceptable during Britains' period of stable state and of expansion. There were exchanges being made. Government needed to meet the demand for more university places. It was prepared to be liberal in helping universities meet those demands. The pressure for change from the centre was always tentative. Its most vigorous attempt to affect university norms was by setting up a competitive and parallel system of the polytechnics.

But if this has been the system upon which we have been able to work, appeals to historic continuity are immediately nullified by the latest act in educational history. We have had negotiation between the state and the universities within a rigged or social market. There have been several points at which the academics have been able to bargain with the centre. They have exchanged degrees of social commitment for enormous

freedoms. The government has been able to establish the rate of currency and the goods for exchange within that market and they have rigged it to ensure that the universities met at least the minimal social criteria. Now, however, in principle the relationships are the same but the terms of trade are very different. We do not remain as free standing contractors. Our tenure can be taken away from us and Britain will now become a country of youngish, middle aged pensioners. Some day a historian might have to note how the detenured university and polytechnic lecturer became active in politics. And at present the centre is establishing not so much terms of trade as managerial edicts. Although Britain is far less ahead than most countries in the proportion of places given to the hard sciences and engineering, they are being reinforced. The government, with apparently the connivance of leading hard scientists and some others as well, have decided to cut down on what they regard as the second class or third class universities and other institutions. The notion of the free standing beneficent institution rewarded by public money for doing good things is no longer without challenge.

This all leaves academics deeply demoralized, and not least because democracy of a kind has produced the present policies. A freely elected government is taming the academics. Legitimate national power is being used to reinforce two traditional policies: that of encouraging a more exclusive excellence, and that of reinforcing particular forms of productive skills. Negotiation, exchange, the rigged social market, and all of the other metaphors which have worked up to now assume that academics hold a freehold. That has now been put into dispute.

What ought to happen? Let me in this final section of my paper explore two parallel "oughts". The first concerns, again, a potential extension of objectives. The second concerns forms of government. I confess immediately that I am more certain of the first than of the second.

The traditional, cosmopolitan, internalist view of higher education remains legitimate. I wish that the protagonists of open access were less raucous about traditional values. A civilised and progressive society ought to be able to encourage many things at once. The contrast well drawn between the metropolitan and cosmopolitan university (Feldman and Hursh, 1980) embodies a range of complementary rather than conflicting needs.

Higher education ought to provide access to the great tradition of scholarship, research, logic, beauty and argument. Those of us in the less prestigious British universities are impressed by the way in which unlikely freshmen, given the chance, recruit themselves eagerly and well to the great traditions of scholarship. I would hate to see any higher education institutions that wanted to work within that tradition being deprived of the opportunity.

Secondly, there is another tradition in British education which needs to be widened rather than narrowed and that is its pastoral tradition. The traditional Oxbridge college did look after its students. I am not worried

here about the way we will continue to treat bright 18-year-olds. Just as important are those in mid-career, or perhaps in no employment at all, who need to reconstruct their personal lives, their careers, their working skills, their social skills, their appreciation of society, and their contribution to society, with the help of skilled and objective teachers in higher education. My own courses at Brunel bring in many such people. Many of them do not have very good formal qualifications. We sometimes turn away those with good qualifications to make room for more interesting but less qualified candidates. We give them theory. We teach them how to make social enquiry. I hope we also give them an opportunity for taking stock of themselves, of reflecting with members of their own peer group, as well as with us, on what their place might be.

And, thirdly, there is the place of higher education in social maintenance and regeneration. I dislike the more radical approaches to this area because they narrow rather than broaden possibilities. Power to the community often means less power to someone else's community. It is rather like diverting traffic from one's own street into somebody else's. Academics should certainly put their abilities behind the eradication of injustice. But there are also less glamorous jobs to be done in helping and working with those who are trying to improve the public services out there in the city, or in the deprived rural areas for that matter.

What about political forms that might accommodate the whole range of purposes? I think there is no way out of the rigged social market. Certainly government must govern. Certainly Conservative ministers have a mandate to cut us down. Certainly we have a moral and intellectual duty to pursue our own values.

But that brings me to a final difficulty. In Britain the universities and the polytechnics have got virtually nowhere against the government because they have no constituencies. There is neither the tradition nor the tax incentives for heavy alumni contributions. The occasional entrepreneur will leave a large sum to an Oxford or Cambridge college so that the members can pray for his soul. But there are no political penalties for ministers who deprive an institution of its student places or part of its subject range. This is the cost of lack of interference with academics. Universities have Councils which are not quite equivalent to your trustees but include symbolically representative people from local government, professional institutions, local political parties and the like. Nothing I have said will guarantee that newly formed minority groups will have a say in the running of the university.

It is assumed that the academic must interpret social values and the effect they should have on scholarship and the curriculum. Outsiders are not allowed to set the curriculum or the subjects for scholarship. Academics expect to answer for themselves in terms of their priorities, in terms of their styles and in terms of their emphases. They are used to doing all of that to their own academic peers.

But is that good enough? In certain areas scholarship and research are

strongly dependent upon groups outside the academy. But in any event, just as our schools are getting stronger governing bodies which enable the professionality of teachers to be tested and reviewed by local opinion, so I suspect in Britain we need far stronger councils and trustee groups who can have their say on what the university is doing and who can join in some of the broader framework decisions. I don't believe that they should decide the curriculum. Nor do I think that groups with a social grievance should decide it either. It does mean, however, that they should be given larger access to decision making through which resources and institutional power are allocated.

But structural changes should follow value changes. If access and purposes are wider, higher education will have wider and stronger constituencies and a wider choice of effective participants in its decision making.

The tension between self-governing academics and their many client groups is universal. The issues have become hotter and more complex as all of our social decision making has become more complicated. The urban university in America has obviously led the way in raising and perhaps answering some of the questions involved.

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Demography, Demogogy and Decline: Or, How the Universities of France and Britain Are Neither Grinning nor Bearing It

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Amongst other sources, this article drew upon *Eurydice* Central Unit's Newsbrief Service. *Eurydice* is the Education Information Network of the European Communities, Brussels (Belgium). I should like to acknowledge the help of all Central Unit Staff and in particular, John Richardson, its Head.

Introduction:

In the early part of the 5th century A.D., the Imperial Court at Rome received a heartrending missive from a nether part of the Imperium. "The barbarians come in growing numbers, they burn our villages and drive away our cattle." History knows this desperate petition as the Groans of the Britons. But, if it touched the stony hearts of the imperial bureaucrats who read it, it influenced their policy not one iota. The legions had left in the year 410 and the Angles, Saxons and Jutes arrived.

Now I am not suggesting that the present policy of the British government towards its universities is one of murther, rapine and pillage, though the execrable atmosphere that pervades British universities today may in some remote manner resemble that shared by my distant Roman British ancestors. However, British academics may be forgiven their bitterness if one takes into account the fact that the circular sent out in June 1981 reduced government expenditure on universities by some 17 per cent over the next three years whilst pointing out that student numbers will have to be reduced from 260,970 in 1979/80 to 248,720 by the academic year 1983/84 in some cases or by 1984/85 in others. The imperial tradition of decimating the legions to encourage them to fight better is ever green!

The British policy stands in marked contrast with that recently assumed by the incoming Socialist government in France. If Britain is moving into the years of the thin kine, France on the other hand is easing her way into the years of the fat kine. This year's university budget is to increase by some 17 per cent compared to the academic year 1980/81. Research investment is to grow by 30 per cent. And current French plans are to set aside around 2.5 per cent of her gross domestic product for research purposes by 1985. (Guy Neave, "Mobility is the key to France's

future," *Time Higher Education Supplement*, January 29, 1982.)

This enormous difference between the policies both countries have assumed vis a vis their universities stems, of course, from the different economic schools currently in vogue — monetarists in Britain and Keynesians or neo Keynesians in France. However, what I want to do in this paper is to examine recent developments in the university sector through three particular perspectives, those of demographic trends, the concept that each government has of the place the university occupies in the polity and finally, to examine some of the rather more subtle changes that have taken place between universities and the central government in Britain and France.

Before going into the corpus of the paper, it is worthwhile for sake of clarity, if nothing else, contrasting and comparing the two systems of higher education and thus set them in context.

France and Britain: Some Similarities, Some Differences

Let us start by the similarities. Universities in both Britain and France, whatever their origins as corporations of scholars, are effectively state financed institutions. In Britain, despite the notion of student fees, at least for foreigners being pitched at an economic level which is in the region of $5,700 per annum, the government pays some 80 per cent of current expenditure. In France, there is no pretence of an economic fee with the result that the French government directly provides some 90 per cent of current expenditure. To be sure, there exists the University Grants Committee in Britain which since 1919 has acted as an intermediary buffer body between universities and the government, thereby preserving a concept of autonomy which, nowadays appears to be in process of vanishing by the hours. In France, by contrast, central government has close control over how money is spent at the level of the individual institution. Universities do not have latitude to shift the money allocated to them between various heads. Nor, for reasons both historical and constitutional is there an intermediary body between the French universities and the state to act as a "go-between." Though, by supreme irony, at precisely the moment when the British government turned the University Grants Committee into its creature — virtually reducing it to the status of messenger of bad tidings — the French government is actively considering whether or not to set up a similar organization. The Freville Report, commissioned by the late Prime Minister Raymond Barre, appeared just before the fall of the Ancien Regime, in March 1981. It recommended a French edition of the University Grants Commission explicitly based on the British model. This idea is being considered by the Socialist government as part of its plans to decentralize the control over higher education.

Second similarity is that, by tradition, the universities in both France and Britain have been intimately connected with state service rather than with providing highly trained manpower for private sector industry. (Guy Neave, "On wolves and crises," *Review of New Trends in Higher Education*

(*Paedagogica Europaea*, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1978). This is not to say that many of their graduates did not go into the private sector, but it was largely regarded as a subaltern role, with the possible exception of medicine and law. In Britain, this connection was never formalized in the same way as it is in France where one sector of the Grandes Ecoles of which there are around 250 with around 100,000 students, is formally linked with the Ministries their students will serve in. Telecom — the *Ecole Nationale Superieure des Telecommunications* with the Posts and Telegraph Department, *Polytechnique* with the Ministry of Defence. In Britain, this nexus is rather more subtle though no less powerful and lies between the two Ancient English — not Scottish of which there are four Ancient Universities — of Oxford and Cambridge and the policy making level of the central civil service. It stems from this that because the university in both countries supplied a considerable number of graduates to state service, both national and municipal, that the university enjoyed what one might term a "protected labour market." Or, put another way, that despite lipservice to the notions of the university being 'responsive' to the economy, this policy had considerable headway to make against long practice of responding to one very particular type of labour market directly controlled by the state. The signficance of this development we shall reserve till later but it is an important element in the broad lines of policy in both countries.

Third similarity is the relatively restricted role played in both countries by private sector universities. The situation is rather more clear cut in France in this respect than in Britain, since the British have a talent, often of making themselves obscure. This is often called a British compromise. If universities are independent corporations the existence of which is recognized by an Act of Parliament through their Charters in Britain, they cannot be said to be private since they do not depend on the money of their students to keep them going. Formally speaking there is only one private university in Britain, the University College of Buckingham. However, unlike other institutes of the same status, it does not have the power to validate its own degrees. This is done by a central agency, the Council of National Academic Awards, usually employed to make sure the non-university sectors degree courses are up to standard. In France, despite the historic push towards central government control, there always have been certain institutions, Catholic in the main, which have sought to maintain their status outside the state system. The Instituts Catholiques at Paris and Lyon and, more recently, the burgeoning of a thousand business schools, some identified with the Grandes Ecoles of the state sector, for instance the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales* of Paris and the *Ecole Superieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales* at Cergy-Pontoise, others with the non-university technical sector, for instance, the *Ecole Francaise de Tannerie* at Lyon or the *Ecole Superieure de Fonderie* on the Paris outskirts.

And now for some differences. They are, of course, legion so I shall touch only on those that have direct bearing on the topic. These involve

four areas: structure, what I will term "quality control" which essentially involves selection and other forms of control over student flows, appointments and nominations to academic posts and finally, the role of the state in higher education.

If, in Britain, the university is the elite sector, it is not in France. Indeed, a French ambassador to your country in a moment of youthful choler and condescension, alluded to the university sector in France as the "swamp." (E. Kosciusko-Morizet, *La Mafia Polytechnicienne*, Paris, 1974, Maspero.) The elite sector in France is to be found in the Grande Ecoles. This leads me straightway to the second major area of difference, that of "quality control." In contrast with the French university — but not, I might add the the *Grandes Ecoles* — universities in Britain have a considerable control over student quality by dint of being able to select between applicants at entry. Legally speaking, the Baccalaureate in France gives one the right to a place in university with the result that selection formally takes place at a later point in the individual's career either at the end of the first year in the case of such subjects as Medicine or at the end of the second year *Diplome d'Etudes Universitaires Generales*. Alternatively, it takes the form of dropping out which is very high in France compared with Britain in some cases as high as 60 per cent compared with a national average of 15 per cent for a three year Bachelor's degree course in British establishments. (Guy Neave "Only when I larf: being an account of the vexations with which higher education in Europe is afflicted," *Higher Education Review*, (in press); Andrew McPherson "Selections and survivals: the sociology of the Ancient Scottish Universities" in Roger Brown (ed.), *Education, Culture and Social Change*, London, 1973, Tavistock.)

A further element in quality control which is not generally recognized in Britain as being particularly powerful, is the indirect control exercised over student flows by the 120 odd Local Education Authorities. These local government agencies disburse grants, based on parental income, to students enrolled in a university course. They cover tuition costs and involve a maintenance or living element. In effect, British students are directly subsidized by local government. Persistent failure at examinations can lead to the withdrawal of these grants. Since it is difficult for students to earn sufficient to pay both fees and to give them living costs even before the onset of the economic crisis in 1973, the threat of withdrawal has always been the beginning if not the wisdom then at least of incentive. And more so today when the likelihood of obtaining a vacation job is even more remote. In France, only the two year University Institutes of Technology set up in 1966 and today numbering some 53 and the 250 odd Grande Ecoles exercise a high degree of "quality control" over their students at the point of admission. The latter have a rigorous system of competitive entrance examinations, the former a close scrutiny over the applicant's school record for the two years prior to application. (Emmanuelle Pautler "The links between secondary and higher education in France," *European Journal of Education*, vol. 16, No. 2, 1981; Jean Louis Boursin, *Les IUTs*, Paris, 1970,

Bourdas.)

However, if the ability of universities in France to regulate **student** quality control is relatively limited in the first instance, in Britain the ability of the state to exercise quality control over **staff** appointments is equally restricted. Appointments, promotion and advancement in Britain are largely a matter of informal peer evaluation within the individual department or Faculty. And this is the same for universities as it is for the non-university sector. In France, by contrast, the state exercises considerable central control over such matters since, as everybody knows, tenured staff are deemed civil servants. Hence, the formal conditions for obtaining tenured posts are laid down by central government, the evaluation of prospective candidates carried out by the *Consil Consultatif de l'Enseignement Superieur* in 1979. (Guy Neave and Ladislav Cerych, **Structure, promotion and appointments of academic staff in four countries: recent issues**, Paris, 1981, Institut d'Education (typewritten).) Or, more precisely, by one of the 44 national subject discipline committees. Nominations to tenured posts is finally made by the Minister of Education. In short, the state of France exercises direct control through means of nation-wide competitions for appointment to a particular **post**, not necessarily to a particular **university**. Thus a person in France may be nominated to a post and subsequently that post attached to a specific university. But, if it is decided that, due to changes in student demands, the post may be re-allocated by central government to another establishment, the wretched incumbent, unless he wishes to face the outer darkness or commit academic suicide, must take up his ox, ass, manservant, maidservant, goods and chattels and go whence he is instructed. Truly, the Minister of Education in France — or his minions — are men having much authority. For like the centurion in the Gospel according to St. Mark, he sayeth to one "Come" and he cometh. And to another "go" and indeed he goeth. In theory, this system of national control over academic advancement and appointments should permit the French government greater leeway in adjusting staffing resources according to the waxing and waning of student demand in different regions. In Britain, this is not possible and some might argue rightly so. However, in times of contraction, where the only alternative seems to be quite massive redundancies, the caprice of a centralized bureaucracy may be the lesser of two evils.

Finally, I come to the role of the state in higher education. In Britain, this relationship has long been close to the 19th century Liberal philosophy by which the state is conceived as a barely tolerable evil that ought to be kept within strictly limited bounds. This ideology emerged particularly forcibly with the establishment of the University Grants Committee which I mentioned earlier. In short, autonomy without which freedom of scholarship and enquiry are held not to be possible may only be guaranteed by the absence of the intervention of the state. This is not the attitude and still less the type of relationship that characterized French higher education. Here, the state has itself a cultural mission — a *mission*

civilisatrice — the purpose of which is to lay down similarity of provision and resources, the definition of national norms of expenditure and appointment procedures, thus setting the outer bounds within which autonomy may exist. In fine, in France, autonomy and freedom though equally part of scholarship and enquiry, can only exist in those areas that the state has defined as not being formally in its competence. The state voluntarily limits in a species of self-denying ordinance its own powers of intervention — logical if one bears in minds that there can be no essential limits of the Republic One and Indivisible in those institutions which ensure its unity. Education has always been seen as a prime instrument of that unity, hence its higher political party role and hence also, the higher degree of conflict inherent in what Premfors has termed the policy-making styles and higher education in French higher education. (Rune Premfors, "National policy styles and higher education in France, Sweden, and the United States," *European Journal of Education*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1981, pp. 253 ff.) A relatively recent example of the state exercising a self-denying ordinance and, at the same time defining those areas of comparative autonomy is, of course, the *Loi d'orientation* of September 1968. It laid down three principles as essential elements of the French version of academic autonomy. These were the principle of staff and student participation in the affairs of the Unit of Education and Research, the principle of the freedom of teaching and the principle of interdisciplinarity. The latter has remained somewhat of a busted flush!

If I have spent overmuch time on these various aspects which differentiate the British university from its French counterpart, it is because recent developments in both countries point to a profound change, no less in the area I have termed, perhaps inelegantly, "quality control" in France than in the relationship between the state and the university in Britain. (Guy Neave, "La notion de limites: modele des liens existant entre l'Etat et l'Universite," *Bulletin de la Conference des Recteurs Europeens* (forthcoming).)

Demography

At first sight, the effect of changes in demographic patterns in both Britain and France appeared to be less significant in affecting the general phenomenon namely a slowdown in enrollment growth rates. As recently as 1976, a report by the Paris-based *Institut Europeen d'Education et de Politique Sociale* echoed the conclusion reached by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development nine years previously. "Only 20 per cent of the variations in enrollment," the report stated, "could be explained on the basis of changes in the size of the relevant age groups." There is now good reason to suspect that the demographic factor in both countries will play a more important part, but not independently. Its effects emerge in conjunction with other factors such as the proportion of the age group transferring to the university and the proportion of the relevant age group obtaining those qualifications that admit students to university. (I.

Hecquet, C. Verniers & L. Cerych, *Recent Student flows in higher education*, New York, 1976, International Council for Educational Development; *Vers un enseignement de masse*, Paris, 1974, OCDE, vol. 2; Ladislav Cerych, Sarah Colton & Jean Pierre Jallade, *Student flows and expenditure in higher education 1965—1979*, Paris, September 1981, Institut Europeen de'Education et de Politique Sociale.)

There are three basic elements involved in the equation of student flows to higher education. First, the size of the age cohort; second, the proportion of this cohort "qualified" to enter university and third, the proportion of those qualified who in effect do so. In common with most other Western European countries, both Britain and France will see a rapid decline in the size of the cohorts aged 18—20 over the next few years. In Britain the peak is currently emerging from the secondary education system and is in the region of 1.015 million; thereafter it will continue to drop until 1997 when it will begin to expand again. (Klaus Hufner, "Demography and higher education: some theoretical and empirical considerations on their interaction," *European Journal of Education*, vol. 16, nos. 3—4, 1981, p. 327; Michael Shattock, "Demography and social class: the fluctuating demand for higher education in Britain," in *European Journal*, *op. cit.*, p. 382). The level of decline, however, will be proportionately greater in Britain than in France. Taking the 1975 figures as a baseline, the percentage fall by 1995 will be in the region of 19 per cent for the former and 12.5 per cent for the latter. (*Impact of demographic change on the education systems in the European Community: information paper prepared by the Education Services of the Commission of the European Community*, Bruxelles, Sept. 1981, *Eurydice*.)

The effect of this fall will, according to all estimates, be far more grave in Britain than in France. This is because the modest growth that took place in the British university sector during the Seventies (some 14.4 per cent compared with an average 40 per cent throughout the European Community) was almost entirely due to the change in the size of the age cohort. For, contrary to France, and indeed to most other European states during this decade, the proportion of the age group reaching a level of attainment that formally qualified them for university, continued to stagnate at around 14.8 per cent. (Shattock, *op. cit.*, p. 384, figure derived from Table II.) This compares with the situation in France prior to 1968 since between 1966 and 1980, the proportion of the relevant age group passing the Baccalaureate grew from 12 per cent to 25 per cent. (Emmanuelle Pautler, "The links between secondary and higher education in France," *European Journal of Education*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1981, p. 185.)

This development is, I must admit, without parallel in Europe and lies at the heart of many of the difficulties of British policy towards higher education. British statistics provide a rather more dramatic picture, though it is difficult to gain a comparable indicator from France, the methods of collecting being somewhat different. British calculations in the early Seventies were based on an "Age Participation Rate," in effect, all those

qualified who entered university expressed as a percentage of the corresponding age group. In 1972, the government White Paper, **Education: a framework for expansion**, looked forward to some 22 percent figure for the Age Participation rate, only to find that this had dropped from 14.0 per cent in 1973—74 to 12.5 per cent in 1980—81. The situation was further compounded in 1978 with the publication of a further government discussion document, *Higher Education into the 1990's*. Despite the growing economic crisis, the English Department of Education and Science envisaged three possibilities: the first with an age participation rate of 21 per cent, the second with it standing at 18 per cent and a pessimistic forecast of 15 per cent. This proves conclusively that one may plan for everything save that which takes place!

A further element of discomfort to British universities, though they are by no means alone in the matter, is the apparent reluctance of those qualified to continue their studies in higher education. If a similar trend is observable in Germany and Italy (Guy Neave, "Only when I larf . . ." *op. cit.*), it does not appear to be so massive an example of voting with one's feet in France. The proportion of those qualified who continued on to university rose from 74.6 per cent in 1976 to 77.3 per cent in 1978—79 (Pautler, *op. cit.*, p. 186). In Britain, the transfer rate of qualified students has always tended to be higher than France -- oscillating around 93 per cent, even as late as 1976. In the past five years, however, it has undergone a dramatic fall, the figure for 1979—80 being 81.1 per cent. (Shattock, *loc. cit.*)

In short, if both Britain and France face a stagnating demographic pattern, the situation is rather more parlous in Britain. There, the effect of demographics decline upon the university is amplified further by both the fall in the proportion of qualified school leavers and their misgivings about continuing extended study after school.

Demogogy:

Lack of students may be the beginning of wisdom in Britain, yet it has also been a heaven-sent boon to the Government, permitting it the justification of reducing the university budget, whilst at the same time making ritual noises about being committed to maintaining and improving the "quality of education." (Cmd 8175, **The government's expenditure plans 1981—82**, London, 1981, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, p. 103.) It is difficult to see how this can be so since the consequences will be such that, during the period 1981—1984, around 20,000 (some 18 per cent of new entrants) young people will be deprived of a place who, had they been born five years earlier, would have been accepted. (Hilary Steedman, "Higher Education in the United Kingdom," *European Journal of Education*, (forthcoming).)

Painful and surprising though such measures might be, the purpose behind them is very similar to that which underlay the strategy introduced in 1976 by the French government. For in both instances the objective of introducing tighter budgetary control was to bring the university sector

closer to what were conceived as the requirements of the market place. The intentions of the British Department of Education and Science in 1980 bear strange similarity to the designs of the French Ministry of Higher Education when, in 1976, to the sound of protesting students and the roar of striking academics, it proceeded to "professionalise" certain areas of second cycle studies. Second cycle studies are effectively, those involving years 3 and 4 in the French university programme and follow directly on the two year *Diplome d'Etudes Universitaires Generales*. (*Select Committe on Higher Education: Education, Science and Arts Committee of the House of Commons*, London, September 1980, Hansard, vol. 1, p. xx; Evidence of Mr. Thompson, Department of Education and Science; "France: the professionalization of second cycle studies," *Council of Europe Newsletter 3/76*, 1976.)

The objective of both policies, despite the five year difference between them, is to reduce the number of Humanities and social science students and to shift student demand firmly into such areas *as* business administration, physical sciences and engineering. In Britain, however, the exercise of public control over such matters is relatively limited and has to work through what in military parlance would be termed an "indirect approach" namely financial control. At best, this is a very blunt instrument indeed, since in the British context, it assumes that, already in secondary school students who would have taken those subjects leading up to Arts and Social Science can shift over to those that lead to business studies and the hard sciences. This is not easily done. (Guy Neave, *How They Fared: the impact of the comprehensive school upon the university*, London, 1975, Routledge & Kegan Paul.) In France, for reasons I have mentioned earlier, the government can intervene in very wide areas that directly affect both the structure of studies, the introduction of new courses, not to mention the validation at national level of both undergraduate and post-graduate studies. Thus, the strategy of emphasizing "vocationally relevant" studies in the French second cycle continued at post graduate level with the sudden coup by the Ministry of Higher Education in the summer of 1980, to invalidate a large spectrum of graduate courses in sociology, psychology and education. Initially some 700 courses throughout the country were axed. Later, under pressure, the Minister uncharacteristically relented. The final head count was in the region of 520. In parallel with the technique of the stick, the tactic of the carrot was also employed. New types of degree and post graduate programs were introduced, principally in the area of business administration and — a new departure for France — the introduction of Engineering degrees in certain carefully chosen establishments. (Gabriel Fragniere, "Changes in the structure and content of courses," *Paedagogica Europaea*, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1978, pp. 110—111.) Engineering had previously been the monopoly of certain specialized *Grandes Ecoles* and did not figure at all in the university curriculum.

The tightening up of government control over the structure of undergraduate and post-graduate courses went hand in hand with equally

fundamental alterations to the budgeting system. Previously, the allocation for general overheads had been based on a per capita allocation. This was replaced in 1977 with a formula of almost superhuman complexity based on such curious items as floor space, teacher student ratios related to national norms, the number of janitors available. Ostensibly announced as a measure to correct certain of the more flagrant disparities in allocations between those paid to larger and politically more influential universities in city centers and the pittance doled out to recently established foundations in non-metropolitan areas, it had another objective as well. This second hidden objective was to tip the balance in favour of disciplines deemed "economically relevant." Economics, law and business studies (*gestion de l'entreprise*) were the most mentioned. But he who talks of favoring one, rarely mentions disfavoring another, discipline. Thus, if this formula was favorable to the three areas mentioned, it was also punitive in the case of those disciplines singled out in the Circular reforming second cycle studies as "cultural" — essentially, the Humanities, and the more tendentious of the social sciences, sociology, psychology and education. Previously, because of their large numbers, a per capita allocation system worked to their advantage.

Beneath an apparently bland budgetary reform was forged an instrument whose purpose was to give the government's strategy greater bite by rewarding the virtuous and punishing the recalcitrant. (For this see Pierre Goldberg, "The university system in France," in Lyman A. Glenny, *Funding higher education: a six nation analysis*, New York, 1979, Praeger, p. 42; for crime and punishment see Louis Levey Garboua and Francois Orivel, "Recent developments in French higher education: an economic perspective," *European Journal of Education*, vol. 17, vol. 2, 1982.) And, as if to drive home the message, the powers of the Recteurs — central government officials who rule over the 26 academic regions in France almost like education's counterpart to the Prefet — were reinforced to cover the first year of higher education.

So far, the nature of these operations remained by and large within the realm of technocratic decency. The sweeping changes in the balance of power on the University Councils, brought about by a midnight coup in the National Assembly during the run up to Christmas 1979, were not. The Orientation law of 1968 created a complex system of constituencies but left full professors in the minority in University Councils. This was overturned by the aptly named lois Sauvage, in memory of the senator who pushed it through the Upper House and henceforth, full professors held 50 per cent of the seats. If justified by the Minister of higher education, Mme. Alice Saunier Seite as an encouragement to academic excellence, it was heralded as blatant electioneering by her opponents. This law is, at present, under process of abolition by the new Minister of Education, M. Alain Savary.

What can one say about these various measures to tighten up "quality control?" Certainly, they amounted to a serious attempt to overthrow the 1968 university settlement. But here one must remember that they can also

be presented as the state beginning actively to exercise those residual powers of oversight which it always retained. (Guy Neave, "Recent trends in education policy in Western Europe," in Patricia Broadfoot, Colin Brock and Witold Tulasiewicz, (eds.), *Politics and educational change*, London, 1981, Croom Helm.) To one French commentator, such things merely showed the Giscardian regime's objective in all its glory — to return the university to its Napoleonic mould. (Bertrand Girod de l'Ain, "Le retour de Napoleon," *Le Monde*, August 17, 1979.)

If tight budgets and tighter central government control were the characteristics of French higher education policy in the dying days of the Ancien Regime, some notable attempts were made to seek new approaches to the question of financial flexibility and central control. Inspired by Raymond Barre, himself an economist and an old university hand before being plunged into the premiership, the Freville Commission which I mentioned earlier made its report in March 1981. Its mission had been to find new models of financing universities. But, like so many government reports, it spoke with forked tongue. It recommended a greater degree of financial flexibility, waxed lyrical on the advantages of the British University Grants Committee as a model "go between," and adored that which the Minister of Higher Education appeared busily engaged upon burning — namely university autonomy. Yet for all this, the Freville report stood as living proof of the old adage that one should beware of Prime Ministers bearing gifts especially on the eve of a presidential election!

The main recommendation of the Freville Report was that central government financing of universities should be reduced to no more than 80 per cent of current expenditure. The balance, it suggested, should be made up by research and teaching contracts passed between local industry and local university. If this appears eminently reasonable in the American context, one must bear in mind that in France there is a certain ideological distaste in subordinating what is regarded as a resource of the nation to the particular whims and fancies of private enterprise whose interests can only represent a part of the nation. Be this as it may, the idea that individual universities should have their financial autonomy increased was not greeted with cries of glee. Autonomy in a cold economic climate is apt to be a highly uncomfortable dress and those who assume it soon understand the embarrassment of Hans Anderson's Emperor.

By curious logic, this idea has resurfaced in the policies of the incoming Socialist government, but this time grouped around the electoral plank of administrative decentralization. The exact financial balance to be struck between those resources paid for by central government and those provided by the future region in the financing of the decentralized university are still matters for discussion. But it is significant that, in the most sustained debate on the future priorities in science policy and research to have taken place since the founding of the Fifth Republic, the Minister of Science and Technology, Jean Pierre Chevenement, has laid considerable stress upon the regional dimension. Links between regional

research institutes, local firms, industry and commerce will be strengthened. Whether this will involve the placing of more notables on University Councils is, as yet, a matter for speculation. The National Assembly has still to discuss the issue, though that shortly. (Guy Neave, "Mobility is the key to France's future," *op. cit.*)

The most marked area of change introduced by the Socialist government has been in the area of staff appointments. In November last year, a report on the structures of the academic profession was presented by Jean Louis Quermonne, professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques. It called for 1,000 new posts to be created a year over the next four years. The government is to implement a policy of supernumary recruitment, though whether the figure advocated by Quermonne will be taken up remains unsure. ("Un rapport mort ne?" *L'Education*, No. 471, November 19, 1981.) A mighty contrast indeed set against the situation in Britain where the government is bent on making 3,000 tenured staff redundant out of a total of some 32,000 in the university sector. (Neave & Cerych, *op. cit.*, Table V, p.29.)

The reasons behind this unexpected development are three: first, the French are taking a rather more long term perspective on the future of the university than their British fellows; second, the birth rate is expected to pick up by the end of the century; (*Impact of demographic change . . . op. cit.*), third, the majority of academics now in post were recruited in the Sixties and early Seventies and will reach retirement just at the time when the age cohorts entering university will begin to expand again. Supernumary recrustment provides, it is felt, a solution both to the problem of aging in the professoriate (over the next eight years less than one per cent of staff will retire) and to the problem of ensuring the maintenance of high quality research and teaching.

Decline:

In this final section, I want to look at the question of the changing relationship between the state and the university in France and Britain. In both countries, this is undergoing profound alteration. It is a very curious spectacle in which each flees towards the models the other seeks desperately to abandon. In Britain there is a steady and relentless move towards central government control and in France the beginnings of a move to loosen the reins of the overmighty state. The irony lies in the fact that central consolidation is being carried out in Britain by a political party whose slogan has long been the preservation of local government and the non-interference of government in the affairs of the university. In France, since at least 1905, the socialist party has been wedded to the concept of Jacobin centralization. It now appears in 1981 enamoured of the notions of local liberty and regional self control. Thus are the British Conservatives becoming Jacobin Centralisers and the French Socialists the adepts of Benjamin Disraeli.

The first move in the direction of centralization in university policy in

Britain goes back to 1973 with the removal from the University Grants Committee of its powers of direct negotiation with the Treasury for the overall university budget. Instead, the Department of Education and Science now acts as an intermediary body. Nor has the recent throat-cutting exercise in staff, students and cash done much to improve the status of that Committee. Rumours are rife of the imminent demise of the UGC. (Jane Steed, "The generation game which the students will lose," *The (London) Guardian*, January 20, 1982). Whether the UGC will be replaced by an overall coordinating agency, combining responsibility for both universities and polytechnics, is a matter for erudite speculation. (See for instance, *Times Higher Education Supplement*, January 20, 1982). The polytechnics are municipally controlled institutions with a system of financial allocation far more rigorous than the universities which are financed on a system of block grants for current expenditure. Block grants are a system of global allocations to be distributed within each individual university in accordance with its specific and particular needs. The question the spectre of the new agency raises is whether the government will not use the occasion to impose an even tighter mechanism of surveillance over university sector finance.

In France, as I have suggested, the main issue at the moment is the development of a new budgetary flexibility with greater regional participation, though the details remain as yet undisclosed. Some commentators have hinted that the state should use the opportunity to revise its overall role in the control of the university. Instead of promulgating nitpicking and irritating decrees in vast numbers, it should perhaps concentrate more on assuming a broader, more coordinating function, leaving the control over the finer administrative details to the base. (Levy Garboua & Orivel, *op. cit.*) At last, the overloaded state may take the initiative to unload some of its historic but, today, largely counterproductive responsibilities.

Nevertheless, alongside the suggestions that control in the financial and administrative domains might profit from a little more flexibility, there are others which suggest an economic rather than a social, libertarianism; principally in the area of "quality control" of students. Among the most controversial are the idea of increasing student fees from the present FFrs 150 ($20 per annum) to FFrs 2,000 ($250 per annum), and the introduction of selection for admission to the university sector hitherto open to all obtaining the Baccalaureate.

Such "heretical" notions were noised abroad by Laurent Schwartz, professor of Mathematics at the top-flight Ecole Polytechnique, during the final debate on the future of Science Research Policy in Paris in January, 1983. Though M. Schwartz may influence people, he will not win friends in his party. He was deservedly savaged both by academics and by student unions.

Conclusion:

The effect of the, demographic down-turn, both in Britain and in France, has been to reveal some of the more outstanding difficulties in the transition from an elite to a mass system of higher education. I have argued that one of the more important features in both countries has been the tightening up of "quality control." In Britain, this involves an indirect approach consisting in squeezing the financial parameters and then leaving the University Grants Committee to pose the unanswerable question of whether the universities wish to be shot or merely hung. The consequences of this policy will be a significant reduction in educational opportunity at the highest level of the system.

In France, the sharpening up of "quality control" has taken the form of alternations in the orientation of undergraduate programmes, and consists in the main in their "vocationalization," together with a reduction in the number of social science research degree courses. If, prior to the arrival of a Socialist President in power, the tendency was to reinforce and underline the traditional powers of central government control over the university, the tide now appears to be flowing in the opposite direction.

I have suggested, though it is perhaps unkind of me, that whereas France has consolidated its move to being a mass higher education system, in Britain this alchemic change has not taken place. Whether this has to do with what some have termed "the long term depression in higher education" (C.A. Pissarides, "Staying on in England and Wales — and why 9 per cent of the 1976 age group did not," *Centre for Labour Economics Discussion Paper No. 63*, London, 1979, London School of Economics, pp. 27—28) which may account for the stagnation in the proportion of young people reaching the threshold from which university education is possible — is still open to question.

Thus, the changes that stand in the offing in both countries are considerable. Yet, curiously if — and when — they take place, each country will still remain in the same position that it occupies vis a vis the other — namely a mirror image. It may turn out that, in the coming decade, French univesities will move towards decentralized control. And British universities will become increasingly under the mailed fist of central government.

Even so, this will not deprive us of that long experience of looking in each other's mirror and, like Caliban, being enraged by our own intolerable reflection.